In this bulletin:
1. F/POLY — Mass resignations within French Polynesia’s ruling party
2. FIJI — Fiji’s Cabinet approves a contingency fund for evacuation of citizens in the Middle East
3. PAC — Two active Tropical Cyclones in Pacific waters
4. FIJI — Fiji’s growing drug problem: India pushes for rehab and community action
5. PALAU — Palau Drug Task Force Holds First Meeting Under Executive Order 498
6. COOKS — Rarotonga continues to lead dengue case numbers
7. FIJI — 2013 Constitution not people’s choice: Kamikamica
8. PACNEWS BIZ — Air Vanuatu begins search for new CEO
9. PACNEWS BIZ — Rising fuel prices may impact Fiji tourism sector
10. PACNEWS BIZ — Pacific Recycling Foundation raises concerns over Vuda Point waste-to-energy project
11. PACNEWS IN FOCUS — Opinion: Back to the Pacific Islands Forum: How Taiwan Can Build Power Without Provoking a Fight
12. PACNEWS IN FOCUS — Alleged cocaine smugglers’ three-month journey from Panama to Sydney ends in arrest
F/POLY – POLITICS: RNZ PACIFIC PACNEWS 1: Mon 06 Apr 2026
Mass resignations within French Polynesia’s ruling party
PAPEETE, 06 APRIL 2026 (RNZ PACIFIC) — A rift within French Polynesia’s ruling party Tavini Huiraatira deepened during Easter weekend with a mass resignation from a group of 14 members.
The resignation was tendered by a group of young members of the local Territorial Assembly.
In their letter, the members of the local parliament, writing to Tavini historic leader Oscar Temaru (81), insist that their decision was “carefully considered” and “does not question the respect we have (towards Temaru).”
The mass resignation de facto brings down Tavini’s majority to 22 within the Territorial Assembly (of a total of 57 MPs).
This also means Tavini no longer has an absolute majority within the House.
The Assembly is scheduled to convene at its next sitting on 9 April 2026.
Any motion of defiance requires the approval of at least 35 MPs.
The other components of the Assembly include 16 from the opposition pro-France (autonomists) and 5 others not registered under any party.
The 14 resigning MPs belong to a group of “moderate” members of the Tavini, who were mostly elected as a result of French Polynesia last territorial elections, in May 2023.
Tensions have since surfaced between the newly-elected members of the “new generation” and the founding members of the Tavini, including party President Oscar Temaru and the party’s number two, Antony Géros (who is also the Speaker of the Territorial Assembly).
At the recently-held municipal elections, Géros lost his position of Lord Mayor of the small city of Paea and in the capital city of Papeete, it was pro-autonomy figure Rémy Brillant who won, well ahead of two pro-independence figures, one was (Tauhiti Nena, who secured 11.03 percent of the votes) running with the approval of Tavini, the other (Tematai Le Gayic, 25) did not get the party’s approval, but went ahead and scored much better (23.3 percent).
In the wake the municipal elections, Le Gayic was the first to signal the split with his party.
The next territorial elections are scheduled to be held in 2028.
The group of dissident MPs is perceived as close to Brotherson (56), who became French Polynesia’s President in May 2023.
Géros was not chosen at the time.
Brotherson has since embodied a less confrontational approach, especially with regards to his perceived good relationship with the French government, as opposed to a more confrontational approach from his party’s historic leadership.
Among the most often cited causes of the rift between Tavini’s old guard and the youngest group of MPs are such issues as French Polynesia’s undersea mineral resources exploitation (which Temaru favours, as a key to the French Pacific territory’s independence).
The younger Tavini MPs, as well as French Polynesia’s Tavini President Moetai Brotherson (who is also Temaru’s son-in-law), are opposed to this exploitation of resources.
This anti-undersea mineral exploitation is also the official stance from the French government, which is warning of potential environmental damage from such operations.
Brotherson’s general stance vis-à-vis independence is also more nuanced and contrasts with the party’s hardline in favour of a short timeline and process.
Since the resignation, Tavini has held several “emergency” meetings, in a bid to reconcile the two opposing factions.
But none of those were conclusive.
Some of the views expressed by militants inclined towards a resignation from Brotherson, which he is opposed to.
Others recommended a one-to-one meeting between Temaru and Brotherson to try and iron out their differences.
“If nothing comes out of this meeting, then Tavini Huiraatira will take action on 9 April,” the party wrote on social networks at the weekend.
“If we start entertaining diverging views of the party’s objectives, we’re in trouble”, an irate Géros told local media.
Temaru and his son-in-law, at the weekend, have separately commented on the crisis.
On Good Friday, they both used biblical, religious metaphors and direct references to Easter.
“Forgive them, for they know not what they are doing” said Temaru, quoting crucified Jesus Christ during his Easter martyrdom.
But he also admitted there were “reasons to be worried.”
Meanwhile, Brotherson posted on social networks: “While some are meeting in tribunal mode, on this Good Friday, I prefer to leave it to God.”…. PACNEWS
FIJI – MIDDLE EAST CRISIS: FIJI GOVT PACNEWS 1: Mon 06 Apr 2026
Fiji’s Cabinet approves a contingency fund for evacuation of citizens in the Middle East
SUVA, 06 APRIL 2026 (PACNEWS/FIJI GOVT) — Fiji’s Cabinet has approved a contingency fund of $1.96 million (US$869,623) to support the possible evacuation of Fijians from Israel, the United Arab Emirates, and the wider Gulf region if the Middle East conflict worsens.
Cabinet confirmed that there are currently 751 Fijian nationals living across the Middle East and nearby regions, with the largest numbers based in the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, and among Fiji’s military personnel deployed in Sinai and the Golan Heights.
The Government confirms that all Fijian nationals in these areas are safe and accounted for.
The Government remains committed to safeguarding the well-being and safety of all Fijians living and working overseas…. PACNEWS
PAC – CYCLONE: RNZ PACIFIC PACNEWS 1: Mon 06 Apr 2026
Two active Tropical Cyclones in Pacific waters
WELLINGTON, 06 APRIL 2026 (RNZ PACIFIC) — Tropical Cyclone Maila has strengthen to a category 3 and has sustained winds near the centre of 120 kilometres per hour with wind gusts to 165 kilometres per hour.
At 10pm AEST, the Australian Bureau of Meteorology said Maila was 590 kilometres west of Honiara and 820 kilometres east of Port Moresby.
Tropical Cyclone Maila continues to strengthen in the Solomon Sea between Solomon Islands and Papua New Guinea.
In its latest advisory, the Papua New Guinea National Weather Service said the Tropical Cyclone Maila category 3 warning is current for Milne Bay Province, especially the coastal and island communities of:
– Woodlark
– Sudest
– Misima
– Rossel Islands
– Including Bougainville
It said Tropical Cyclone Maila is likely to intensify into a Category 4 system within the next 24 hours.
It said people should stay away from the edge of the sea, and seek higher ground until the cyclone threat passes.
The National Airports Corporation has advised the travelling public and all stakeholders that due to heavy rainfall since Saturday the runway and taxiway at Tokua Airport, in East New Britain, have flooded, caused by surface water runoff from outside the airport.
Flights into Tokua Airport in East New Britain have been suspended until further notice.
Damage to buildings along the coastline of Mondo village, located at the weathercoast of Ranonggah Island, Western Province have been reported.
A local resident, Hendry Korio, told the Solomon Star that strong wind struck the Mondo coastal area from Saturday morning through Sunday, causing significant damages to semi-permanent houses and boat sheds located along the shoreline.
He said some boats were also carried inland by strong wind and high swells.
Communities of Simbo and Ranonggah are expected to feel the full brunt of the bad weather in the coming days.
Korio said, many food gardens are not spared, with banana plantations and root crops destroyed by the strong winds, raising concerns over lack of food for the villagers in the coming days.
A tropical depression that lingered over Fiji waters has intensified into a tropical cyclone.
The Fiji Meteorological Service said Tropical Cyclone Vaianu, a category one system, was located to the north of Fiji and is moving south at 9km/h.
It said the current winds near the centre are about 74km/h and expected to strengthen further.
The weather service said winds may increase to 92km/h knots later today, and up to 111km/h by tomorrow.
The cyclone is expected to continue moving south to southeast over the next 24 hours while intensifying.
While the system remains north of Fiji, it is being closely monitored as it strengthens and further updates will be issued as necessary…. PACNEWS
FIJI – DRUG FIGHT: FBC NEWS PACNEWS 1: Mon 06 Apr 2026
Fiji’s growing drug problem: India pushes for rehab and community action
SUVA, 06 APRIL 2026 (FBC NEWS) — The Indian High Commission has urged urgent collaborative efforts to tackle the growing drug problem in Fiji, emphasising the need for a dedicated rehabilitation center to support those affected.
Speaking on the issue, Indian High Commissioner Suneet Mehta welcomed the proposal for a drugs rehabilitation center and called on the Sanatana Dharam Sabha to actively participate in finding solutions.
“The proposal from the Sabha is encouraging. I would also like to encourage the National President of the Sanatana Dharam Sabha to take this movement forward and address the growing menace of drugs in the country.”
The call comes amid rising concerns over substance abuse in Fijian communities, with leaders stressing the importance of prevention, awareness, and structured rehabilitation programmes to protect vulnerable youth.
High Commissioner Mehta also highlighted the role of community leadership and partnerships in combating the issue.
Sanatan Dharam Pratinidhi Sabha President, Dhirendra Nand, confirmed that the organisation will continue working with relevant authorities to eliminate drugs from society.
“As you can see in our banners, we are advocating against drugs in the country. We are also raising awareness about violence against minors and women, as well as the rising cases of HIV and AIDS. Various messages are being sent through multiple platforms.”
By involving community organisations like the Sanatana Dharam Sabha, authorities aim to build a united front against drug abuse and establish sustainable support systems for those affected…. PACNEWS
PALAU – DRUG FIGHT: ISLAND TIMES PACNEWS 1: Mon 06 Apr 2026
Palau Drug Task Force Holds First Meeting Under Executive Order 498
KOROR, 06 APRIL 2026 (ISLAND TIMES) — Palau’s National Working Group on the Fight Against Illegal Drugs held its first meeting on 30 March, launching a coordinated national response under Executive Order 498.
The group, chaired by Justice Minister Jennifer S. Olegeriil, outlined its structure and priorities, focusing on a unified strategy that combines stronger laws, public education, community engagement, enforcement and expanded treatment services.
Formed after President Surangel S. Whipps Jr. declared 2026 the year to “Just Say No to Illegal Drugs,” the working group brings together leaders from government, traditional institutions and key agencies.
Members stressed that success will depend on sustained collaboration across all sectors to address illegal drug use nationwide…. PACNEWS
COOKS – HEALTH: COOK ISLANDS NEWS PACNEWS 1: Mon 06 Apr 2026
Rarotonga continues to lead dengue case numbers
RAROTONGA, 06 APRIL 2026 (COOK ISLANDS NEWS) — Rarotonga remains at the centre of the nation’s dengue outbreak, with Te Mare Ora (TMO) Ministry of Health reporting 15 active cases as of 01 April.
According to the latest Operation Namu26 update, released on 02 April, no new cases were reported on 27–28 March. However, five new cases were confirmed in Rarotonga between 29 March and 02 April.
“For the last 12 days, the only cases reported were for Rarotonga only and no cases for the Pa Enua,” TMO stated. The 27 March report indicated that, as of 26 March, only Rarotonga and Aitutaki had reported positive cases in the previous seven days. Aitutaki last recorded a positive case on 20 March, while Rarotonga has continued to account for the majority of active cases—15 since 21 March.
The country had 19 active dengue cases as of 26 March, but encouragingly, there have been no hospital admissions for the past three weeks. Other islands remain clear: Atiu has gone six weeks without a case, Mauke four weeks, and Mangaia is now entering its third week with no recorded dengue cases.
As the Tutaka Programme is set to run from 13–24 April, TMO continues peri-focal spraying and larvae surveillance, including slashing overgrown areas and clearing drainage and streams around Rarotonga to limit mosquito breeding.
Meanwhile, the impact of the Cook Islands outbreak is also being felt abroad. In New Zealand, 57 percent of dengue cases with a travel history were diagnosed after returning from the Cook Islands.
According to ReliefWeb’s 24 March report, which cited NZ Arbovirus Notifications, eight confirmed imported cases of dengue were reported in New Zealand between 14 and 20 March. Among these, 57 percent had returned from the Cook Islands, 29 percent from Samoa, and 14 percent from Indonesia…. PACNEWS
FIJI – POLITICS: FIJI SUN PACNEWS 1: Mon 06 Apr 2026
2013 Constitution not people’s choice: Kamikamica
SUVA, 06 APRIL 2026 (FIJI SUN) — Fiji’s 2013 Constitution is again under challenge, with claims it was never the people’s choice.
Speaking at a public consultation on constitutional reform at Fiji National University’s Nasinu Campus last Friday, former Deputy Prime Minister Manoa Kamikamica said the country must confront how the current Constitution was introduced.
“A constitution must reflect the hopes and values of its people. It must not be imposed. It must be chosen,” Kamikamica said.
Kamikamica told the audience the 2013 Constitution lacks legitimacy because it was introduced under an unelected regime without broad public consultation.
He said this had created a gap between the law and the people it is meant to serve.
“The 2013 Constitution was never truly chosen by the people of Fiji,” he said.
He stressed that reviewing the Constitution is not about removing rights, but strengthening them.
“This is an opportunity for the people to reclaim their voice,” he said.
Kamikamica also pointed to what he described as a “democratic deficit” in the current system, saying key principles such as judicial independence and separation of powers needed to be restored.
He said the Constitution should serve as a tool for unity and progress, not control.
“It must be an instrument of unity, not division of empowerment, not control,” he added.
The MP is calling for greater public participation, particularly from young people, saying the next Constitution will shape their future.
“We must encourage every citizen to have a say, that is critical,” he said.
The constitutional review process is expected to gather public views before final recommendations are made.
Kamikamica said Fiji now has an opportunity to correct the past and build a Constitution that reflects the will of its people.
“The time has come to build a Constitution by the people, for the people,” he said…. PACNEWS
PACNEWS BIZ
VAN – AIRLINE: VANUATU DAILY POST PACNEWS BIZ: Mon 06 Apr 2026
Air Vanuatu begins search for new CEO
PORT VILA, 06 APRIL 2026 (VANUATU DAILY POST) — Air Vanuatu is in the process of recruiting a new Chief Executive Officer (CEO) as the national carrier works to rebuild and strengthen its operations following a turbulent period.
The position, based in Port Vila under Air Vanuatu (Operations) Limited, calls for a leader capable of delivering visionary leadership while driving operational excellence, financial sustainability, and an improved customer experience.
According to the Government Public Relations Officer (PRO), Kiery Manassah, the current Acting CEO is Joseph Laloyer, who has led the airline in multiple stints over the years, including both permanent and interim roles. Laloyer has been a recurring figure in Air Vanuatu’s leadership, providing continuity through several transitional periods.
Air Vanuatu has experienced multiple leadership changes throughout its history. Notable former CEOs include Jean Paul Virelala, the longest-serving chief executive, who led the airline from the 1990s to 2005 during a period of expansion, followed by Terry Kerr during a less documented transitional period. In more recent years, Derek Nice led the airline from 2018 to 2020 before stepping down amid COVID-19 restructuring, and Atu Finau took office in 2021 before being replaced.
Earlier leadership includes Peter Roberts, who served as the first CEO following the airline’s re-establishment in 1987.
The recruitment of a new CEO comes at a critical time as Air Vanuatu looks to restore stability, rebuild confidence, and position itself for long-term commercial success in the regional aviation market…. PACNEWS
FIJI – TOURISM: FBC NEWS PACNEWS BIZ: Mon 06 Apr 2026
Rising fuel prices may impact Fiji tourism sector
SUVA, 06 APRIL 2026 (FBC NEWS) — Fiji’s tourism industry could face growing uncertainty as rising global fuel prices threaten to increase travel costs and reduce visitor numbers.
Officials say tensions in the Middle East, particularly around key shipping routes like the Strait of Hormuz, are pushing up global oil prices, which could impact international air travel.
In an interview with FBC News, economist Mereseini Waibuta said for a tourism-dependent economy like Fiji, higher fuel prices could lead to more expensive airfares, putting pressure on both airlines and travellers.
“We have a lot of tourists coming in. Fiji Airways has announced that its flight routes will not be affected, but the question is for how long, because we are talking about rising fuel prices.”
While Fiji Airways has indicated operations will remain normal for now, Waibuta warns the situation could change if fuel costs continue to climb.
She is also urging tourism operators to invest more in domestic tourism to cushion potential impacts.
“Perhaps it’s time for us to promote tourism locally. We have a lot to offer and people within the country who can travel, so we have internal tourists,”
Officials are also monitoring the situation closely, as any drop in flights or visitor numbers could affect hotels, tour operators and other businesses that rely on international arrivals…. PACNEWS
FIJI – PROJECT: FBC NEWS PACNEWS BIZ: Mon 06 Apr 2026
Pacific Recycling Foundation raises concerns over Vuda Point waste-to-energy project
SUVA, 0 APRIL 2026 (FBC NEWS) — The Pacific Recycling Foundation says it continues to receive increasing concerns from members of the public over the proposed Waste-to-Energy project at Vuda Point.
The organisation says that over the past week, it was contacted by community members in Vuda who raised worries about possible environmental, health and social impacts of the development.
PRF Founder Amitesh Deo says these concerns should not be ignored, especially while the Environmental Impact Assessment is under public review.
He says the organisation is hearing directly from people who are uncertain about how the project could affect their future.
PRF says it has already submitted its position to the Ministry of Environment and Climate Change, highlighting issues such as the risk of recyclable materials being diverted into the plant, possible long-term environmental and health effects, and concerns the project could undermine recycling efforts and impact livelihoods.
The foundation also states there are reports a similar proposal by the same developer was not approved in Australia, raising further questions about the project.
Deo says decision-makers must ensure public feedback is properly considered, adding that development should not come at the cost of community concerns.
He also says it is concerning that opposition to the project has reportedly been described as coming from “a few selfish people,” stressing that those raising concerns are doing so to protect their environment and livelihoods.
PRF further says there is a growing trend of glorifying wealthy investors in development discussions, warning that financial power alone does not guarantee the right solutions for Fiji.
The organisation is now urging government and stakeholders to ensure the EIA process remains transparent and inclusive, while confirming…. PACNEWS
PACNEWS In Focus
The views expressed in PACNEWS are those of agencies contributing articles and do not necessarily those of PINA and/or PACNEWS
Opinion: Back to the Pacific Islands Forum: How Taiwan Can Build Power Without Provoking a Fight
KOROR, 06 APRIL 2026 (ISLAND TIMES) — Taiwan’s return to the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) in 2026 should not be read as a simple diplomatic “comeback.” It is better understood as a rare inflection point in Pacific regionalism—one that gives Taipei a chance to reposition itself from a politically contentious presence to a consistently useful partner in the Blue Pacific’s long-term development agenda.
The facts are now clear. Palau will host the 55th PIF Leaders Meeting from 30 August to 04 September 2026, under the theme “B.E.L.A.U.—Building Economies: Life. Action. Unity.” Palau’s president has publicly signaled that all dialogue partners will be welcomed back—an unmistakable response to the precedent set in 2025, when external partners were shut out in an effort to preserve internal unity amid intensifying great-power competition. Taiwan’s officials have separately indicated that Taipei will again participate as a development partner in 2026.
Why does this matter beyond Taiwan’s own diplomatic storyline? Because the Pacific Islands have become a strategic “triple junction”: climate risk, ocean governance, and geopolitical competition now intersect in ways that reshape regional institutions and external partnership rules.
Start with geography and sovereignty. Pacific island states may be small in land area and population, but they sit atop vast maritime domains. Their exclusive economic zones, fisheries, seabed resources, and the sea lanes and undersea cables that connect Asia and the Americas make ocean governance central to their statecraft. Add climate vulnerability, low elevation, extreme weather, and the fiscal devastation that follows disasters, and you have a region where “development,” “security,” and “survival” are no longer separable categories.
In this context, aid and investment are not side issues; they are structural forces. Australia and New Zealand have long been dominant donors and institutional partners. Japan sustains deep engagement through a mix of development assistance, infrastructure, and multilateral diplomacy, including the longstanding PALM summit process. China’s development footprint has recalibrated but remains politically salient, especially where financing and infrastructure intersect with domestic politics and elite competition. A major Australian think tank’s Pacific Aid Map series has documented the evolving patterns of development finance and the way China’s engagement has stabilised and adapted after earlier surges, illustrating how aid flows can reshape political and economic incentives.
The United States, meanwhile, is not simply “back”; it is embedding its Pacific posture into institutional and legal architecture. Washington has emphasised partnership with the PIF as part of a broader Indo-Pacific approach, seeking to work through regional mechanisms rather than purely bilateral channels. And the renewed Compacts of Free Association (COFAs) with Palau, the Federated States of Micronesia, and the Marshall Islands have locked in a strategic bargain, security access and strategic alignment in exchange for long-term economic assistance, reinforcing America’s role as a foundational power in Micronesia. U.S congressional and legal analyses put the scale of renewed COFA assistance at roughly $7.1 billion over twenty years, underscoring how the Pacific is now treated as a core national interest rather than an episodic concern.
These overlapping external strategies are precisely why the PIF’s internal cohesion, and its rules for engaging external partners, have become more important, not less. The PIF is no longer just a summit; it is the region’s primary mechanism for collective bargaining: on climate finance, on fisheries and ocean governance, on infrastructure standards, and on how outside powers are allowed into Pacific decision-making. The PIF’s “2050 Strategy for the Blue Pacific Continent” is explicit about long-term, Pacific-owned priorities and accountability.
That institutional lens also clarifies Taiwan’s dilemma—and its opportunity. Taiwan’s diplomatic presence in the Pacific has narrowed in recent years as several countries switched recognition, illustrating how Pacific politics can become a theater for cross-Strait competition. Yet Taiwan still maintains formal ties with Palau, the Marshall Islands, and Tuvalu, and retains deep people-to-people and development relationships across the region. The more urgent question is not how to “win” recognition battles, but how to create partnership value that Pacific governments and communities will defend because it serves their priorities.
This is where Taiwan’s strategic value to the Pacific, and to external partners, becomes clearer than the traditional “diplomatic allies” framing suggests.
Taiwan is not a military power in the Pacific. Its leverage is functional: it is a high-capacity democracy with a world-class technology base, a proven ability to deliver complex systems under constraints, and a dense private-sector ecosystem that can move faster than many state-driven aid programmes. If Taiwan can translate these strengths into lower transaction costs and higher delivery reliability for Pacific partners, it can build a form of influence that is resilient precisely because it is not dependent on headline politics.
For foreign audiences, this matters for three reasons.
First, Taiwan is a practical contributor to regional resilience. In a region where capacity constraints are a binding limitation, projects fail not mainly due to a lack of ambition, but because maintenance, training, data governance, and institutional handoffs are underfunded or overlooked. Taiwan’s comparative advantage lies in “implementation intelligence”: designing systems that can be operated by small administrations, training local teams, and building feedback loops and transparent data practices. That is a strategic asset in the Blue Pacific context.
Second, Taiwan can serve as a standards-reinforcing partner. Pacific governments are increasingly wary of opaque financing and short-term projects that create long-term liabilities. A partner that emphasises transparency, accountability, and locally owned governance can strengthen—not weaken—Pacific regionalism. That helps the PIF maintain unity as it navigates external competition, a concern repeatedly highlighted by Australian strategic commentary on regional cohesion.
Third, Taiwan is increasingly relevant to the U.S and allied Pacific approach—even without being framed as such. Washington’s Pacific strategy is not designed to “carry” Taiwan into regional institutions. It is designed to sustain a workable regional order, reduce the costs of strategic competition, and demonstrate visible development outcomes that Pacific publics can trust. Taiwan can complement that agenda by supplying what large donors often struggle to provide: execution capacity, trusted technical cooperation, and durable partnerships that survive electoral cycles. In other words, Taiwan’s value is not that it makes the Pacific “more anti-China,” but that it can make Pacific development partnerships more credible and effective—thereby strengthening the region’s agency.
But this functional strategy only works if Taiwan avoids two predictable pitfalls.
The first is over-politicisation. If Taiwan’s PIF engagement is narrated primarily as a symbolic contest with Beijing, Pacific leaders will have less room to work with Taipei without raising domestic and regional costs. In the wake of the 2025 decision to exclude external partners, Pacific governments are signaling that they want to manage external competition, not be consumed by it. Taiwan’s posture should reflect that preference.
The second is “project theater.” Pacific communities have seen too many announcements that do not translate into sustained delivery. Any Taiwanese initiative pitched at PIF 2026 must demonstrate credible pathways for maintenance, local ownership, and long-term financing. Otherwise it will be perceived as a one-off public relations exercise.
Which brings us to a substantive theme that can tie Taiwan’s technical strengths to Pacific priorities while also aligning with emerging global climate governance: ocean-based “blue carbon.”
Blue carbon refers to carbon captured and stored by coastal and marine ecosystems—most commonly mangroves, seagrass meadows, and tidal wetlands. For the Blue Pacific, this is not a niche environmental topic. It sits at the intersection of climate mitigation, coastal protection, fisheries health, tourism value, and community livelihoods. It is also an area where global climate and carbon-market governance is still evolving, and where credible models are urgently needed.
That urgency comes with a warning. Blue carbon has become attractive precisely as voluntary carbon markets face a crisis of confidence. Without rigorous measurement, reporting, and verification (MRV), and without governance safeguards against double counting, weak additionality claims, or inequitable benefit sharing, blue-carbon initiatives can trigger reputational and political backlash. In small island states, where land and marine tenure can be complex and where coastal communities depend on nearshore resources, the legitimacy of any blue-carbon project hinges on social consent and tangible co-benefits—not just carbon accounting.
This is where Taiwan could offer a compelling, credible proposition: not “selling carbon credits,” but helping build the institutional and technical infrastructure that makes high-integrity blue carbon possible.
A Palau-anchored approach, aligned with the host’s agenda and timed before PIF 2026, could focus on three practical pillars.
Governance and legitimacy. Work with Palauan counterparts to map the “minimum viable governance” conditions for blue-carbon projects: who holds authority, how community consent is obtained, how benefits are shared, how data sovereignty is protected, and how disputes are handled. This turns blue carbon from a speculative promise into a structured policy option.
Digital MRV and capacity. Combine satellite observation, field sampling, and community-based monitoring into a transparent MRV framework that is affordable for small administrations. Taiwan’s strengths in digital systems and data governance could be used to develop reusable tools, templates, training modules, dashboards, that help local teams operate MRV systems without perpetual external dependence. The PIF’s own 2050 Strategy emphasises ownership and accountability across society; MRV capacity is one way to operationalise that principle.
Finance and durability. Instead of treating carbon revenues as the sole business case, design blended pathways that connect blue carbon to resilience investment: coastal protection benefits, fisheries recovery, ecotourism value, and results-based finance. This reduces the risk that projects collapse when carbon prices fluctuate or verification costs rise.
Importantly, blue carbon also offers a platform for constructive U.S–Taiwan complementarity in the Pacific without forcing Pacific partners into overt geopolitical alignment. U.S policy increasingly links strategic competition with tangible delivery—energy, infrastructure, resilience, and governance. Taiwan can add “implementation depth” to those aims: turning broad resilience commitments into field-level programmes that can be audited, scaled, and trusted. This is the kind of division of labor that strengthens Pacific agency: it expands the menu of credible options available to Pacific governments, rather than narrowing it to a binary choice.
For a foreign audience, the takeaway is straightforward. Taiwan’s strategic importance in the Pacific is not only about diplomacy or symbolism. It lies in the practical capability to help make Pacific regional priorities deliverable—especially in emerging domains where global governance is still being written. PIF 2026 in Palau, after the turbulence of 2025, offers a stage where effectiveness will matter more than rhetoric. If Taiwan uses its return to anchor partnerships in high-integrity, capacity-building, and locally owned initiatives, blue carbon among them, it can build influence the way the Pacific itself increasingly demands: through results that strengthen sovereignty, resilience, and regional unity.
And that, ultimately, is the kind of soft power that endures…. PACNEWS
PACNEWS In Focus
The views expressed in PACNEWS are those of agencies contributing articles and do not necessarily those of PINA and/or PACNEWS
Alleged cocaine smugglers’ three-month journey from Panama to Sydney ends in arrest
CANBERRA, 06 APRIL 2026 (ABC) — It all started just before Christmas last year.
The MV Raider, a U.S-based merchant ship built in 1991 that had disappeared from shipping tracking websites in 2021, suddenly reappeared.
The boat was in Cristobal, a port town in Panama, Central America.
After being sold off to an “undisclosed buyer” four years earlier, the MV Raider was now registered under a new flag, the African nation of Togo.
It also had a new destination — Sydney, Australia.
According to the International Transport Workers’ Federation, workers were told the MV Raider was to be delivered across the Pacific Ocean to its listed new owner, a Brisbane-based manufacturer called Rosenbauer.
The problem was Rosenbauer had no idea it was coming.
“We sell big fire trucks,” a company representative told the ABC from their Brisbane office.
“I’d love to know where they’ve got [our] details from, the cheeky buggers.”
It is just one element in a three-month saga involving the MV Raider — a ship that traversed multiple Pacific countries and the Australian coast in an alleged plot to import cocaine to Australia.
And this week it all came to a head.
According to the Australian Federal Police (AFP), in the four years the MV Raider disappeared it was being rebuilt by its “undisclosed owner” to incorporate secret smuggling tunnels, what the AFP called “smuggling hides”.
On Monday, after almost three months at sea, six members of its crew were charged with drug trafficking, with police alleging the boat, at one stage, had almost six tonnes of cocaine aboard.
Experts say the journey itself shows the lengths alleged drug traffickers are going to bring product to Australia — and the amount of product being seized in Pacific waters — as cartels continue to target the cash cow that is Australia.
A ‘bizarre’ journey
According to the International Transport Workers’ Federation, an advertisement was put out on social media in December last year for crew to join the MV Raider for a 25-day journey to Australia.
Eleven Honduran and Ecuadorian nationals boarded the boat, and according to ship-tracking websites, the ship set off on 22 December, heading towards Sydney.
But it never got that far.
On 16 January it was intercepted by French authorities near French Polynesia.
The French say 4.8 tonnes of cocaine was found on board, worth about $1.5 billion (US$1.03 billion) in the Australian market.
Yet French Polynesian President Moetai Brotherson told the ABC “overcrowded prisons” prevented the French territory from prosecuting the crew.
“We leave it to the country of origin or the country of destination,” he told the ABC at the time.
The 4.8 tonnes of cocaine was dumped overboard and the boat and its crew continued on their way.
But unbeknown to the MV Raider crew, according to the Australian Federal Police this is when its own investigation began.
They allege one tonne of cocaine remained aboard in a smuggling hide deep in the boat’s bowels — cocaine that was missed by the French.
“This is actually fairly common [with the] lengths that narcotic smugglers go to hide this stuff,” said Jennifer Parker, adjunct professor with University of Western Australia’s Defence and Security Institute.
“On vessels I’ve seen false walls, false ceilings, false deck heads, things shoved in pipes, things weighted down in bilges, all sorts of things.”
Parker, a former naval officer who served in the Middle East and the Carribean on counter-narcotics operations, said huge financial incentives inspired smugglers to come up with all sorts of “weird and wonderful ways” to attempt to import product.
“Clearly drug cartels in South America have determined that the market in Oceania, and predominantly the market in Australia, is so lucrative that it’s worth their time investing in different ways, different types of vessels and different networks to smuggle these narcotics across the Pacific,” she said.
‘Nothing was found’
After the stop in French Polynesia, the MV Raider continued sailing towards Sydney.
But on 24 January, after transmitting a distress call for engine repairs, it was escorted into a port in the Cook Islands.
Cook Islands Customs said border agencies conducted a search following its arrival and “nothing was found”.
The captain and crew were questioned and allowed to go ashore, under supervision, to obtain “essential provisions”.
At the time, Australian Federal Police declined to comment on whether they were tracking the vessel or planning to make arrests.
Again the crew and the vessel were released, and from the Cook Islands the MV Raider made its way to Sydney, the AFP alleges, with that tonne of cocaine still aboard.
On 19 February the MV Raider was 180 nautical miles off the NSW coast, near Wollongong when it was intercepted by NSW Police and Australian Border Force Officers.
Despite embarking on a two-week journey towards Australia, in an unexpected twist on 20 February, when only 150 nautical miles from its intended port of Sydney, the vessel made a quick turn north-east.
It declared its new destination as Noumea, the capital of French territory New Caledonia.
They interviewed the crew and advised them they would not be permitted entry to Australia.
The ABC understands it is alleged that the one tonne of cocaine hidden on the ship was still aboard at that time.
Recent media reports suggest that the AFP received intelligence about suspected additional cocaine aboard, soon after the seizure by French authorities, but it did not share this intelligence with NSW Police and ABF officers who “met” the ship off the NSW coast in late February.
It is suggested the AFP allowed the MV Raider to sail unimpeded along Australia’s east coast rather than intercept it at the risk of the crew claiming asylum.
For six days, the MV Raider tracked towards New Caledonia, but on 26 February, about 250 nautical miles off the coast of Rockhampton, it once again stopped and did a U-turn back towards Sydney.
In a press release, Australian Federal Police said it suspected an Australian-based crew operating on behalf of “a larger criminal syndicate” was looking to rendezvous with the MV Raider to conduct an “at-sea transfer” within Australia’s Economic Exclusion Zone.
It says it has evidence alleging six crew members were connected to “at least one drop-off of drugs within Australia’s territorial waters”.
The AFP said it seized a satellite phone allegedly used by senior members of the MV Raider crew to “communicate with the syndicate’s bosses based offshore”.
According, to Parker this is a common strategy.
“They plan to sit off the coast and rendezvous with a smaller vessel to bring those drugs into the country,” she said.
The ‘drop off’
With the vessel pointed toward Sydney, on 26 February it lingered off the coast for a week.
The ABC understands this is the time where the AFP alleges the “drop-off” of the cocaine occurred.
While lingering outside Wollongong for days, the MV Raider then made a mayday call on 12 March, with the crew saying they were short of water and food.
Under international law, Australian authorities are obligated to respond.
In its final journey, almost three months after setting out from Panama, the MV Raider was escorted into Snails Bay in Sydney Harbour.
On 19 March, the 11 crew were escorted to immigration detention.
And on 30 March, six of the men were charged with drug trafficking.
The ABC understands of the five men who were not charged, three have been deported.
“One remains in Villawood [Detention Centre], last we heard, and there’s one that we can’t account for,” International Transport Workers’ Federation’s Ian Bray told the ABC.
Bray said the organisation had been in touch with some of the crew’s families in Honduras and Ecuador and the organisation had “engaged legal representation” to look at the merits of the case.
“All the stories that you hear throughout 40 years of a working life as a seafarer, this would be in the top two most bizarre cases that I’ve had to deal with, or had any involvement with,” he said.
AFP Commander Brett James said investigations were continuing into what happened to the one tonne of cocaine — and the origin of the drugs — alleged to still be on the boat when it left Cook Islands.
“We will work with our international and domestic law enforcement partners to identify the criminal syndicates — and anyone else — involved in facilitating this alleged cocaine import,” he said.
The six men will reappear in court in May…. PACNEWS
