DEVELOPMENT cooperation is no longer the soft edge of foreign policy. It is now uniquely suited to advancing Australian Foreign Minister Penny Wong’s four priorities: region, relationships, rules and resilience.
Dubbed the “4Rs”, the framing places development cooperation at the forefront of Australian statecraft.
When releasing the federal budget this week, the government chose to keep Official Development Assistance (ODA) spending stable as developing countries in the Indo-Pacific confront “a triple shock of major global aid cuts, trade disruption and energy insecurity linked to conflict in the Middle East”. Some saw this as a missed opportunity to do more to address the humanitarian impacts of the Iran war. At the same time, the government did not follow the lead of other donors in cutting aid despite fiscal constraints. There is a growing recognition that Australia’s future is
inextricably linked to sustainable development in the Indo-Pacific, and the 4Rs explain why.
The 4Rs have long featured in Australian development policy and practice, even if the formulation is new. They are threaded through Australia’s 2023 International Development Policy and have come into sharper focus in the years since. This week, they were used to structure the ODA budget summary, albeit with trade-offs as some multilateral funding shifts towards more immediate regional needs.
The patient work of the development program in reinforcing international rules rarely attracts attention, but those rules deter conflict, facilitate trade, and underpin security in the region.
Rhetorically, though, the 4Rs have been overshadowed by the positioning of development as a “tool of statecraft” alongside defence and diplomacy. The “all tools of statecraft” approach has elevated development cooperation in foreign policy discourse, but leaves open the question of its role. There has been a tendency to bundle development with other tools – or arms of national power – as part of a broader narrative about maximising Australia’s international influence. This risks diluting development’s distinct value and purpose, even as it competes with those same tools for a share of the budget.
The 4Rs help refocus the narrative. They were most clearly articulated by Wong in a major foreign policy speech in November 2025. Wong explained that “in an ever-less-stable world”, resilience had joined region, relationships, and rules as Australia’s foreign policy priorities.
Starting with the region.
Wong stated that the Indo-Pacific is where Australia has the most at stake and where it can have the most effect. “Our overriding responsibility … is to support peace, stability, and prosperity in this region,” she declared. As most of Australia’s nearest neighbours are developing countries, helping them tackle development challenges must be central to this effort. Reflecting this, the government has directed more than 75 cents in every development dollar to the Indo-Pacific. Development needs in the region are “large and growing”, so more deliberate use of non-ODA support for development will be required to complement sustained ODA.
Next is relationships.
Wong described how Australia is redefining its regional relationships, including through “landmark agreements that come together to safeguard the region we want”. Australia is pursuing deeper integration with its Pacific partners and closer economic and security links in Southeast Asia. Development cooperation provides the foundation for this emerging regional architecture. As Wong put it, “We build the inclusive infrastructure and economic opportunities to transform lives, foster stability and grow prosperity. We build our shared regional capacity to defend and secure our sovereignty”. This is fundamentally a development project. Other tools of statecraft can reinforce regional ties, but they rarely substitute for the trust, understanding, and reciprocity fostered through long-term development partnerships.
Third is rules.
While acknowledging that international rules are being “undermined and broken”, Wong argued they still set expectations for behaviour and provide a framework for cooperation. For a middle power like Australia, this matters. Development cooperation plays a quiet but important role here, supporting partners to adopt, implement, and, at times, shape international rules. Wong gave the example of capacity development in the Indian Ocean on the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, which is the backbone of regional maritime governance. The patient work of the development program in reinforcing international rules rarely attracts attention, but those rules deter conflict, facilitate trade, and underpin security in the region.
Finally, resilience.
Its inclusion speaks to the evolving and interconnected risks confronting the Indo-Pacific, including great-power competition, climate change, economic vulnerabilities, and rising conflict. In addition to enhancing domestic resilience, Wong stressed the need to “support resilient societies in our region”. This is core business for the development program: enabling states and communities to absorb, adapt, and transform in the face of ongoing change, rather than simply responding to crises. Recent research by the Development Intelligence Lab confirms the point. When Southeast Asian experts were asked how international partners could best assist in the context of the Iran War, the top response was strengthening national resilience systems.
The 4Rs framing demonstrates how development cooperation advances Australia’s foreign policy priorities in the current strategic environment. No other tool of statecraft contributes as directly across all four: region, relationships, rules, and resilience.
The “all tools of statecraft” approach may have given development a seat at the table, but the 4Rs can shape the decisions taken there.
