Opinion: What happens now that MEPC80 is behind us?

Next year the delegates of the 6PAC Plus will be back in London to determine the basket of measures that will accompany the newly adopted strategy to limit greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions of international shipping. The 6PAC Plus (Fiji, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Nauru, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu) have been in these waters before and are again preparing to face the perils lurking beneath the still waters of these upcoming negotiations.

From June 26 to July 7, 2023, the members of 6PAC Plus underwent an extensive two-week period marked by their participation in the Intercessional Working Group (ISWG)-GHG 15 and Marine Environment Protection Committee (MEPC80) meetings held at the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) headquarters in London. Among these delegates, the states with low ambition found cause for celebration, while those with high ambition felt a sense of disappointment. The revised initial IMO strategy, which emerged from these discussions, fell far short of even constituting a bare minimum to uphold the ambitious 1.5 degrees Celsius temperature target. The text of the revised strategy presented to the Pacific delegation was notably deficient, prompting them to confront the decision of whether to accept its shortcomings or oppose it, fully aware that it would inevitably gain adoption regardless of their stance.

Nevertheless, undeterred by this predicament, the 6PAC Plus embarked on an earnest campaign of advocacy, leading to the incorporation of more robust interim checkpoints for the years 2030 and 2040. The indicative checkpoints outlined in the strategy’s framework, calling for 20% and 70% reductions in greenhouse gas emissions from 2008 levels, demand substantial overhauls in both the global fleet and its energy sources. However, these targets, while necessitating significant changes, still fall short of the comprehensive measures advised by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) to align with the temperature objective set forth in the Paris Agreement. Although not perfectly congruent with the IPCC’s guidance, these objectives do represent a closer approximation.

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The implications of the revised IMO strategy are significant both on renewable energy and fossil fuel investments. The outlined anticipations for reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions in the strategy, coupled with its heightened aspiration to adopt technologies, fuels, and energy sources with minimal to no GHG emissions, underscore the urgency of investing in machinery and fuels with near-zero and zero GHG emissions. This also prompts a comprehensive assessment of potential risks and benefits associated with ongoing and future investments. A significant number of investors are inclined towards greater certainty, which is achievable through the transformation of the strategy into a formal policy, as anticipated by the recently adopted timetable (expected by 2025). During the interim phase, uncertainties arise from the translation of ambiguities within the strategy into detailed International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL) amendments and the approach to be taken for implementing and ensuring compliance.

What is already understood is that remote developing countries, particularly those heavily reliant on imports for essential goods, such as the Pacific Small Island Developing States (SIDS), are already grappling with substantial shipping costs. Similarly, export-oriented developing nations engaged in the trade of low-value bulk commodities or operating far from their target markets (or both) are apprehensive about the potential repercussions of global (and regional) regulations on trade dynamics and import expenditures.

The Comprehensive Impact Assessment (CIA), slated to present an interim report during MEPC 81 and a final report at MEPC 82, promises to provide a much more intricate examination of the effects of these measures. The CIA should facilitate the identification and mitigation of disproportionately adverse consequences within the purview of the IMO.

The timelines now are as follows which constitutes the policy measures needed to be adopted in order to achieve the 1.5 degrees temperature goal by 2050.

While Member States are bound to approach the formulation of a basket of measures with distinct requirements, viewpoints, and limitations once more, it remains imperative that a collective outcome is equitable and pursued in the best interests of all Members. Undoubtedly, the value inherent in a global basket of environmentally stringent measures cannot be downplayed.

Maria Sahib is a member of the Micronesian Centre for Sustainable Transport. The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the opinions of this publication.