Regionalists generally identify three characteristics of regionalism, namely: economics, security and politics. Economic regionalism focuses on economic and financial aspects. Generally speaking, this is effectively an alternative reference to a trade bloc. Security regionalism focuses on peace and security. Political regionalism focuses on shared aims of the nation states and any issues that a state may face. Overall, however, it can be said that all three forms of regionalism are interconnected and can overlap. Consequently, any analysis of regionalism is likely to exhibit all three characteristics. The 2050 Strategy for the Blue Pacific Continent is no exception. However, given the relative weight of political issues vis-à-vis others, it can be classified as essentially political.
The political orientation of the 2050 Strategy can be gleaned from various sections of the Strategy including: Leaders’ Vision for 2050, Our Values, Leaders’ Commitments to 2050 and from the seven thematic areas. The latter includes respective ‘levels of ambition’ up to 2050. Two politically laden themes, namely: ‘Political Leadership and Regionalism’ and ‘People Centred Development’ are foregrounded under Thematic Areas. Their respective ‘levels of ambition’ speak of the need for greater cooperation to safeguard, secure and progress the Blue Pacific Continent; unity and cohesiveness of political leadership; responsiveness of the regional architecture; recognition and respect for collective approach; drawing on cultural and spiritual attachment to land and the ocean; gender equality and equal access to public services so that no one is left behind.
It is clear that the 2050 Strategy, whilst it contains some economic and financial aspects, is certainly not a trade bloc. This is just as well. Pacific regionalism has an extremely poor record in this matter and in regional economic integration as a whole.
By way of clarification, the founders of the South Pacific Forum (SPF) in 1971 had wanted to pursue an ‘economic union’. It took 10 years for the SPF to get started. However, it was a misstep. SPF Leaders launched SPARTECA in 1981 – a preferential, non-reciprocal trade agreement instead of a Free Trade Agreement (FTA). SPARTECA’s contribution to regional economic integration was thus minimal, as can be expected.
In the early 2000s, the Forum launched its first FTA. The Pacific Regional Trade Agreement (PARTA) however did not get past first base. Forum members lacked unity to get it signed. It was shelved and, in its place emerged PACER – an economic framework agreement between Australia and New Zealand on one hand and the Pacific Island Countries (PICs) on the other, and the FTA, Pacific Island Countries Trade Agreement (PICTA) for PICs only. The last time I checked, PICTA is only being implemented by 50% of its membership, and it’s a ‘Trading in Goods’ agreement only, with the ‘Trading in Services’ agreement has yet to be fully ratified two decades into its lifespan.
PACER, of course, has given rise to FTA, PACER Plus. To date, not all PICs have signed the FTA, and the two largest PICs and Melanesian Spearhead Group trading giants – Fiji and Papua New Guinea, have opted out of the FTA.
The direction that the SPF Leaders wanted to pursue way back in 1971 – for regional economic integration and even with advanced economic and political integration in a trade bloc, has not materialised. It can be concluded that members of Pacific regionalism may lack the appetite for greater regional economic integration through trade. This is perhaps more apt for PICs than for Australia and New Zealand, given the latter’s respective integration into the global trading system.
The lack of appetite is instructive but understandable. PICs, given their relative size, geography, resource endowment, relative economic status etc., may be concerned about freeing up trade and the loss of tariff revenue, apart from loss of any competitive edge in trading that may result. Notwithstanding the dominant political direction of the 2050 Strategy, the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat (PIFS), is already taking essential economic-related measures to counter competition hitches under the 2050 Strategy’s Thematic Areas 2 (People Centred Development) and 4 (Resource and Economic Development). The Secretariat is to be commended for this.
Notwithstanding the lack of appetite for regional economic integration, Pacific regionalism has grown since 1971 to what it is today. As I will discuss below, it has been members’ political rationality that has been the driving force of Pacific regionalism and will continue to do so in the context of the 2050 Strategy going forward.
But first, it should be noted that the 2050 Strategy is definitely not a security type regionalism in its orientation, even though it has some security aspects to address. Thematic Area 3, for example, is titled ‘Peace and Security’. Greater amplification is given under its respective ‘level of ambition.’
The above makes a lot of sense. For Pacific regionalism, security as a form of threat, has already been rationalized and contextualised. For the Forum, its greatest existential security threat is climate change. The Forum’s relevant concerns and stratagem in this matter are enshrined under the Boe Declaration. This is likely to have an independent status vis-à-vis the 2050 Strategy for the Blue Pacific Continent.
The political rationality of Pacific regionalism ever since its origin in 1971 is clearly discussed by Professor Greg Fry in his Framing the Islands (2019). Essentially, Forum leaders, over the last five decades of the Forum’s existence, have found ‘political significance’ in the ways and means by which they had conducted their special brand of Pacific regionalism. In his book, Dr Fry discusses the political significance of regional governance, regional political community, and diplomatic bloc.
It should be noted that the concept of ‘political community’ referred to by Dr Fry is not that of the EU integration type: with its supra-national structures and even with a Parliament, even though such has been promoted for the region by a number of regional commentators, for example, Messrs Birman Prasad, Jim Rolfe and Wadan Narsey. As Dr Fry discussed in his book, Pacific regionalism has its own brand of regional community by way of the Council of Regional Organisations of the Pacific (CROP) – nine agencies chaired by the PIFS Secretary General. The litmus test for Pacific regionalism now is for the regional planners to conceive of a regional architecture that places PIF at the apex of this regional community. Such an architecture is the PIF Leaders’ specification to regional planners.
This will be an interesting exercise from the perspective of sovereignty. In the last 50 years of Pacific regionalism, PIF member states had not felt the need to transfer, nor share their respective sovereignty with regional bureaucrats. This explains the lack of any supra-national structures under PIF. There are, of course, organisations that resulted from pooling of regional resources, but with clear-cut member states’ oversight, such as the University of the South Pacific. The question of course is whether this will remain PIF’s modus operandi for the next half century.
The author is a former Fijian Ambassador and Foreign Minister, and runs his own consultancy company in Suva, Fiji.
The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the opinions of this publication.
