What about risk management?

Inspectors at the site of the Fukushima power plant. File photo

By Ambassador Kaliopate Tavola

In early May, former Secretary General of the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat (PIFS), Dame Meg Taylor, called on Japan to reconsider its decision to release more than 1 million tonnes of treated nuclear-terminated water from the Fukushima power reactor into the Pacific Ocean. Dame Meg might have anticipated a more conciliatory response from Japan similar to that the Forum (PIF) had received way back in 1985. She would be disappointed.

In the early 1980s, Japan had proposed to dump cement-solidified drums of low radioactive waste in the high seas. After much multi-tiered protest by PIF Leaders, Japan relented. But its decision was unashamedly diplomatic and impermanent. In 1985, then Japan Prime Minister Nakasone was to visit Fiji. On the eve of his official visit, he announced his intention to shelve, but not to abandon the dumping proposal in deference to island sensitivities on the matter.

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This time around, Japan is obdurate. It is pursuing a two-prong approach. The first is its attempt at appeasement of PIF Leaders. Somewhat crude; but Japan is clutching at straws.

Japan is a member of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and hosts one of the two Agency’s Regional Safeguards Offices in Tokyo. The other one is in Toronto, Canada – interestingly, another Pacific Ocean Rim country.

Japan’s game plan to enlist the aid of the IAEA is instructive. The IAEA is essentially an instrument for peace. It serves as an intergovernmental forum for scientific and technical cooperation in the peaceful use of nuclear energy and nuclear power worldwide. Fifty percent of PIF’s membership are members of the IAEA. Of these, Tonga is yet to deposit its ratification instrument with the Agency.

Japan was able to secure a statement from the IAEA, clearly in response to Dame Meg’s call for a reconsideration of its decision. The Agency’s glib one-liner was: “Japan’s dumping plan is technically feasible.”

To be technically feasible, in my book, means that a project or activity can be designed, constructed, operated, or carried out to accomplish its goals and objectives, using accepted engineering and other technical principles and concepts. The one-liner above is specifically focussed on feasibility. It lacks, in my view, clarity regarding the management of risks that not only can undermine such feasibility but, more importantly, be responsible for negative externalities especially those that would impact PIF’s ‘Blue Pacific.’

This disposal system, the feasibility of which has been assured by the IAEA, can still be riddled with prospects of risks of various types. Nic Maclellan discusses some in his article following PALM 9.  Japan, for example, has argued that the radioactive tritium still contained in the treated wastewater will be diluted by the vast waters of the Pacific to reduce environmental damage. Maclellan, however, provides: “scientists from the US Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution report that, beyond tritium, the treated wastewater will include isotopes such as carbon-14, cobalt-60 and strontium-90 which have vastly different toxicity and can be incorporated into marine biota or seafloor sediments.”

Dame Meg’s replacement, Henry Puna, received the IAEA one-liner on his way to Australia last June. He was obviously unhappy about the brevity and the insincerity of the response. He was reported on Pacific Beat calling for ‘frank discussion’ and more answers from Japan and from the IAEA. He sought a meeting with the head of the Agency. A response was to come later.

Japan’s other approach was to use its early July Pacific Islands Leaders Meeting (PALM 9) to inform – not consult: “that (Japan) would ensure no harm will come to the environment from dumping treated nuclear waste into the ocean.”

Japan’s modus operandi as regards PALM 9, is instructive. It was non-negotiable. And it is not the first time, in any case. In the 2018 PALM, Japan informed Pacific Leaders that the QUAD countries (US, Japan, Australia and India) had completed their geopolitical remapping of the Pacific and beyond, and that the PIF region was going to be a mandatory part of Indo-Pacific. It was an imposition. PIF Leaders were essentially pawns in this critical decision.

This time around, Japan’s non-negotiable strategy was somewhat bizarre. Having announced its stance that no harm will come to the environment, Prime Minister Suga then “announced a new ‘Pacific bonds’ policy to strengthen cooperation between Japan and Forum Island Countries (FICs).” Furthermore, on climate change, “Japan was committed to net-zero emissions by 2050 and to reduce emissions by at least 46% by 2030.” Clearly, such a policy declaration was an inducement. And, as Nic Maclellan wrote after PALM 9, such a diplomatic push to offer bonds was ‘damaged’ by Japan’s plans to proceed to dumping wastewater into the Pacific Ocean.

We await the uptake of these ‘Pacific bonds’ by FICs with great interest.

Response to Puna’s appeal for information from the IAEA came after PALM 9. Islands Business reported that the IAEA was to: ‘review and monitor the safety of water release at Fukushima Daiichi’ and that the agency and Japan has signed an agreement highlighting

areas to be reviewed and monitored as follows:  

  • The radiological characterisation of the water to be discharged,
  • Safety related aspects of the water discharge process,
  • The environmental monitoring associated with the discharge,
  • The assessment of the radiological environment impact related to ensuring the protection of people and environment,
  • The regulatory control including authorisation, inspection and review and assessment.

If the agreement above was trilateral to include PIF as the third party, would Henry Puna have signed? Given the absence of a clear policy and statements on risks and their management and the absence of focus on the consideration of PIF’s concerns, I doubt he would have done so.

Puna needs to persevere and seek details on how Japan and the IAEA will manage the risks that will definitely impact the areas of review and monitoring stated above.  Identifying, analysing, evaluating, ranking, treating, monitoring and reviewing the risks should form the total package that Japan and the IAEA offer to the FICs.

Given the defective record of the Tokyo Electric Power Company and the long-term nature (four decades or more) of the current disposal proposal, Puna’s mission to seek information and assurances is proper. The FICs have a right to know, especially the nine PIF members who are also members of IAEA.  On the other hand, Japan and the IAEA have the obligation to provide such information.

The treatment of FICs as mere pawns in regional, geopolitical and global matters must cease. FICs, with their limited resources, punch above their weight in extra-regionalism and multilateralism. Global partners, especially those who are established PIF Dialogue Partners must do their utmost to support the FICs in fulfilling their global responsibilities.