In the whirlwind of speeches to cement Kamala Harris’ presidential credentials, the Pacific Islands have hardly rated a ews, but on critical regional issues relating to existential climate threats and hard economic times, a Harris win bodes better than a Trump triumph.
The Pacific hope for Harris is that she will deliver on promises made in the Pacific Partnership Strategy, the two Pacific Islands–U.S summits (2022 and 2023), and the many diplomatic visits under President Biden.
The question is: What will her administration do better, or differently?
The climate crisis and rising insecurity
Climate change is the top security issue in Pacific Island countries. There is an urgent need to act, with a recent UN report providing scientific evidence of increasing Pacific climate vulnerability.
The Democratic Party’s platform recognises the climate crisis as “an existential threat” and commits to clean energy, reduced emissions, and enhanced global climate leadership, but Harris is yet to speak forcefully on climate commitments.
Under Harris, the United States needs to deliver more on climate and economic resilience in the region.
Despite U.S Deputy Secretary of State Kurt Campbell’s “hot mic” comments in August about “giving the [policing] lane” to Australia, the United States is sidestepping, not walking away.
Defence diplomacy has been booming since the 2022 Solomon Islands–China security deal, and there are no signs it will slow down while China is knocking at the Pacific Islands’ door.
The U.S Defence Department is ramping up security training, exercises, and equipment provision.
Any wavering by the West on climate, security, or development commitments will be exploited by China, and Pacific Island countries will leverage all sides to survive.
Summits promise big, but are still to deliver
The two Pacific Islands–U.S summits under the Biden administration, as well as the U.S-initiated Partners in the Blue Pacific, promised big.
The summits alone committed more than US$1 billion to resilience, regionalism, and sustainable development. A Harris administration is likely to honour pledges to increase the U.S diplomatic and development footprint in the Pacific.
Still, Harris has a lot of ground to make up, given decades of near absence in the South Pacific. Kurt Campbell admitted that “there have been periods where we have not been as deeply engaged as we should have been”.
Excepting the U.S Compact states (Micronesia, Marshall Islands, and Palau), the United States is not a top aid and trade partner in the Pacific.
In countries such as Papua New Guinea, there is concern that U.S interest is too focused on geopolitics and strategic issues to the detriment of Pacific development priorities.
To maintain credibility, a Harris administration would need to do more to unlock economic and social development opportunities.
One critical area is health security, clearly articulated in the 2024 Pacific Islands Forum Leaders’ Declaration.
The Democratic Party’s commitment to the World Health Organisation (WHO) augurs well, in contrast to the previous Trump administration’s withdrawal from the WHO during the pandemic. Even so, coordinated U.S action for health gains has room to improve.
Regional realities and rivalries
Some regional commitments of high importance are locked in, whoever takes the oath of office in January.
The U.S Senate has approved more than US$7 billion for Compact states to assist with infrastructure and development in exchange for U.S military access and exclusivity. New embassies have been established in the region, and finances to support summit commitments approved.
But a Harris administration can’t coast.
There is a soaring resentment about US deportees to the Pacific Islands who are associated with violent crimes and the drug trade.
Emotions are also running high on the failure of all sides of American politics to take action on the U.S nuclear weapons testing legacy.
Harris has been silent on these issues, but the Pacific Islands will keep pushing for justice. Greater U.S engagement is welcome, but not geopolitical rivalries that reduce development options.
The 2022 U.S National Security Strategy aims to “effectively compete with the People’s Republic of China”. Harris would need to clarify how this would translate in a region eager to remain “friends to all”, China included.
Pulling together
With so many pressures on the United States for global engagement, leveraging strategic partnerships with Australia, New Zealand, Japan, and others in the Pacific Islands will be essential.
The Democrats have a better track record than their opponents on Pacific collaboration, especially for delivering enhanced connectivity and critical infrastructure.
However, more innovation and implementation are needed.
The United States has the assets to deepen people-to-people relations, and to strengthen government, business, and civil society networks.
In the words of a Pacific Islands senior official in Canberra, “it is not only about U.S dollars, what we need is U.S relationships that are deep and enduring”.
The Biden administration did the diplomatic courting, put words on the policy page, and splashed cash. Harris needs to have a Pacific policy vision and show she can deliver.
Dr Meg Keen is Senior Research Fellow in the Pacific Islands Programme.
The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the opinions of this publication.