On August 2, ballots for the Pacific Engagement Visa (PEV) closed for eight participating countries, with the exception of the Federated States of Micronesia and Palau who each received a two-week extension. Whether this will go unchallenged as unfair by other participating countries, remains to be seen.
The absence of Samoa, Marshall Islands and Kiribati in this inaugural round also means that 300 visas remain unaccounted for from the initial 3000 PEV country quotas that opened on June 3.
Samoa was concerned about its high migration outflows, unproportional economic returns, and acute shortage of a skilled in-country workforce.
Kiribati needed more time to decide on its participation. Marshall Islands like the Federated States of Micronesia and Republic of Palau, who have a Compact of Free Association with the United States of America, did not participate for reasons unknown. It will be interesting to observe how Australia carefully manages this reallocation (if any) given the enormous interest from the Pacific.
Hyped as Australia’s much sought-after permanent residency visa for citizens from the Pacific and Timor Leste, country quota contention, low interest and the decision by some countries not to participate in the inaugural PEV round, pose significant to its objectives of its Pacific diaspora. For the Pacific, fair representation through respectful consultations remains important if Australia is to achieve full Pacific buy-in for the PEV.
For now, the Federated States of Micronesia, Fiji, Nauru, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu, and Timore Leste braces themseves in anticipation for an announcement of the ballot outcomes.
So, what’s next in the PEV process? The Australian Department of Home Affairs, Immigration and Citizenship describes four stages. First, the ballot opens; second, register in the ballot; third, ballot selection; and fourth, apply for the visa. Explanatory notes for each stage were published with useful links.
The Pacific Engagement Visa Support Service visited participating countries, providing information sessions throughout the ballot period, but confusion remained on how to register for the ballot, when to provide a formal job offer, what funds are required for PEV process completion, how long After notification of selection, candidates proceed to Stage 4: Applying for the visa.
This is where all requirements from health and character assessments, English language proficiency and formal job offer is required. Included dependents must satisfy the visa requirements and either the principal applicant or spouse can show proof of a formal job to qualify towards satisfying the 192 subclass visa requirements. There is no formal advice yet on how long the selection of ballots will take before successful applicants are notified. As a reference point, another similar visa lottery, New Zealand’s 2024 Pacific Access Category (PAC) scheme, opened in May, closed in June and notifications issued on August 2. It would be safe to predict a 1-2 months or slightly longer turnaround given there are more countries in the PEV than the PAC.
Beside uncertainty over ballot outcome dates, questions persist on what happens to initial quotas if those who progressed to the approval of visa stage are unable to satisfy all the requirements. Will there be a re draw of names from the ballot to replace unsuccessful applicants to fill that country’s quota? Or will initial numbers count towards the country quota with potential for each country to increase applicants’ success rates in the next round?
Acquiring further information on ballot registrations and success rates by country will provide important analysis in assessing Australia and each country’s capacity to collaboratively support and enhance the success of the PEV. Equally important is whether a re-distribution of visas is needed to maintain regional harmony.
When the PEV was launched earlier this year, a pro-rata formula was adopted to guide the allocation system using population size. During the consultative process to legislate the PEV, a Pacific Mobility Index based on three core dimensions—climate vulnerability, diaspora, and social wellbeing—was proposed by independent Pacific research scholars. This was critical for maintaining a fair and equitable selection that promotes unity in the Pacific region. Australia’s pro-rata formula meant that countries with the highest population like PNG get the biggest share (1350) compared to the smaller or least populated countries like Nauru and Palau with under 20,000 respectively.
Whether this calculation accurately reflects competing priorities of the Pacific family and Timor Leste, remains contentious. As is the motivation for other quota decisions such as diaspora size, existing migration opportunities, and demand from participating country given some Pacific states with established links to Australia have relatively higher quotas compared to those with limited access.
What is clear, is the need for the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat (PIFS) to consolidate its efforts through a dedicated migration agency under the Council of Regional Organisations of the Pacific (CROP) to reap the benefits of temporary and permanent migration of its Blue Pacific citizens within and beyond the region. The Pacific cannot afford to have loose workforce planning of its human capital, especially now as popular labour mobility schemes and the prevalence of climate change on mobility, see citizens leave in droves. The Pacific nations must re-assess and re-position their efforts in maximising brain gains and upholding citizen rights to remain in their homeland or maintain links back home when they opt to access better livelihoods elsewhere. This should be the Pacific’s new migration direction.
Natasha Turia is a Papua New Guinea PhD candidate at the Department of Pacific Affairs, Australian National University, currently undertaking research in PNG’s political economy of temporary labour mobility arrangements with Australia and New Zealand.
Akkarina Rimon is a Kiribati PhD scholar in Climate Mobility at the School of Regulation and Global Governance, Australian National University.
The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the opinions of this publication.
