THE latest Quad foreign ministers’ meeting, held last month in New Delhi, produced an ambitious catalogue of new initiatives.
It emphasised that cooperation by the grouping would deliver “tangible benefits to the region” through initiatives on maritime surveillance, port infrastructure, energy security, critical technologies, and humanitarian assistance.
Speaking immediately after the gathering, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio said that the grouping had “real achievements and real accomplishments”.
But announcing cooperation is one thing – sustaining it is another.
The Quad suffers from an institutional memory problem. It possesses no permanent secretariat, no treaty framework, and no standing implementation body capable of ensuring continuity across political cycles. This may give the Quad flexibility, though that flexibility comes at the cost of durability.
This matters because the initiatives announced each year are not one-off projects. They require sustained attention over time if they are to produce results.
Announcing cooperation is one thing – sustaining it is another.
An examination of the record shows that the grouping has a poor track record of sustaining focus after the communique is signed and the flags are packed away.
The Quad Cancer Moonshot initiative, for example, was announced in 2024 but is now barely heard of. It promised a focus on tackling cervical cancer across the Indo-Pacific, a bid to demonstrate the Quad’s desire to address everyday challenges facing the region, not just geopolitical ones. It does not appear in the latest statement.
Similarly, the Quad Vaccine Partnership in 2022 was described as a defining effort to deliver vaccines across the Indo-Pacific. The end of the pandemic goes some way to explaining why the plan has faded since, but the vaccine challenge facing the Indo-Pacific also goes well beyond Covid-19. Many countries in the region still struggle with immunisation gaps and uneven access to essential vaccines. Instead of evolving to address these broader challenges, the Quad initiative slipped out of the conversation.
In 2021, the Quad devoted considerable attention to space cooperation, announcing plans to use satellite data for climate monitoring and disaster response and establishing a dedicated space working group. At the time, it was presented as a major new domain for Quad cooperation. Now, space receives only passing mention in Quad discussions, overshadowed by fresh priorities.
Most glaringly, the uncertainty surrounding the annual leaders’ summits has undermined the Quad’s political visibility.
Some of the Quad’s most prominent achievements have emerged from the foreign ministers’ and working-level processes. Maritime cooperation, for instance, has steadily evolved from one initiative to another, with each building upon its predecessor. Maritime logistics integration, intelligence-sharing systems, interoperable coast guard operations, coordinated repair and refueling networks, and permanent maritime information-sharing mechanisms are precisely the kinds of arrangements that generate institutional habit and continuity.
The success here reinforces the point about the need for sustained attention. Surveillance systems are only as effective as the information-sharing arrangements and operational networks that support them. Success will depend on whether officials continue to exchange information, update systems, and expand cooperation with regional partners.
Many of the Quad’s other initiatives have yet to demonstrate a similar degree of bureaucratic ownership.
Consider the new port infrastructure partnership that the Quad countries will pursue in coordination with Fiji. The test will come when the Quad is willing to publish periodic updates on its progress. The same is true of energy security. The latest Quad discussions rightly recognise the growing vulnerability of maritime energy routes. Yet securing those routes will require continued coordination among shipping authorities, coast guards, energy agencies, and maritime regulators long after ministers have moved on to the next set of priorities.
If the Quad wants its initiatives to endure, it must devote as much attention to implementation as it does to announcement. A working group would help, as would regular reviews by think tanks, academics, and non-governmental experts to monitor the progress of new initiatives, identify implementation gaps, and ensure that projects do not simply disappear from the agenda. A standing feature of future Quad meetings should require leaders and ministers to report not only on new initiatives but also on the fate of old ones.
Neither leaders nor foreign ministers implement policy. That responsibility falls to officials, working groups, and bureaucracies.
