PACIFIC aviation systems are increasingly vulnerable to hybrid threats that combine cyber intrusion, disinformation and strategic coercion, according to Dr Fetriani, a senior analyst at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute.
Speaking with Islands Business about aviation security in Fiji and across the region, Fetriani said Pacific countries should not treat cyber risk as a distant or abstract problem, describing them as pressure points.
“The risk always exists,” she said, stressing that even where no major aviation cyberattack has yet struck the Pacific, the region cannot afford to assume it is immune.
Her warning comes as aviation systems around the world become more dependent on digital infrastructure, GPS navigation and interconnected communications.
Fitriani said dependence created a clear vulnerability. She pointed to overseas cases where cyber interference disrupted aviation operations, including incidents in Europe and South Korea.
In one example, she said a European aircraft was forced to switch away from automatic systems when its GPS was affected. In another, South Korea was able to contain a suspected cyber intrusion because it had already prepared an emergency response plan and backup systems.
That, she said, is the lesson for Pacific governments and aviation authorities: preparation matters more than prediction.
“It is important to have first the playbook of what happens if that cyber crisis takes place,” she said.
“Authorities need to know in advance who makes decisions, how systems shift to manual control and what backups are available when the primary network fails.”
Fetriani said resilience depended on redundancy, not just technology.
“The concern is to have redundancy of systems; aviation operators must be able to move to secondary systems if the main one is compromised or knocked offline. Without that, even a limited cyber incident could quickly become a broader operational crisis.”
She also warned that the threat is not only technical. In a crisis, misinformation can spread as fast as the disruption itself. If official channels are slow, vague or absent, she said, falsehoods and opportunistic messaging fill the vacuum.
“If the official does not respond readily with the correct information, then that demand for rapid information will be supplied by an actor that will take advantage of the crisis.”
Crisis Preparedness
That dynamic, she argued, makes communication planning part of aviation security. Governments and airport authorities need a media playbook, a contact structure for families and travelers, and a clear timetable for press releases and public updates.
Without that, she said, fear and rumour can deepen the damage, especially when people are trying to figure out whether loved ones are safe.
“The Pacific’s recent experience with cyclones and flight diversions shows how quickly one crisis can expose another. When severe weather forces aircraft to divert, airports and emergency systems are already under pressure.
In those circumstances, she said, hybrid threats could exploit weak points if the region has not prepared for overlapping scenarios.
“The best we can do is to have our partners ready,” she said, while emphasising that saving lives must remain the priority.
Fetriani also raised concerns about foreign involvement in aviation infrastructure. She said governments need to think carefully about who supplies critical technology and whether vendors could introduce hidden security risks.
“It is a concern, especially whether we have a trusted vendor,” she said, adding that countries need standards for what technology they procure and stronger scrutiny of systems that could allow backdoor access or hidden vulnerabilities.
Cost is part of the problem. Small Pacific states often do not have the leverage to buy the most secure systems at the best price, she said.
“That is why regional cooperation matters: working together on procurement, standards and bargaining power could help countries buy better systems and reduce exposure.
“Pacific states should not face the challenge alone, and partners such as Australia, New Zealand and the EU could help strengthen regional resilience.”
She said the biggest vulnerability Pacific aviation authorities may be overlooking is not a single piece of hardware or software, but the absence of a fully developed fallback plan.
In her view, the region needs stronger redundancy, better cyber hygiene, regular software patching and a clearer crisis communication strategy before an attack or a false narrative tests the system in real time.
Pacific aviation is not yet in crisis, but the conditions for one are already in place.
“The risk is still there, especially with a natural disaster that we cannot really predict as mankind.”
