Page 22 - Islands Business February 2023

Opinion Opinion

COUNTERING CHINA’S PACIFIC

AMBITIONS

By Rory Medcalf Pacific in the 21st century was not due to some hawkish Wash-
ington plot, but was an imposition from Beijing: part of the
Like empires past, Xi Jinping’s China seeks three grand priz- expansion of a rising China’s interests and influence across the
es in the Pacific: wealth, control and presence. Australia and globe. Australia, the U.S. and the rest are catching up with
other Pacific nations have recognised the nature and scope of that new reality.
this neocolonial ambition and the risk it brings; responses have The shift did not occur overnight. A crystallising moment
veered from complacency to overreaction, fatalism to alarm. was Beijing’s redefinition of its 2013 One Belt, One Road
The events of 2022 – especially the controversy over China’s geoeconomic plan (later renamed the Belt and Road Initiative,
security agreement with Solomon Islands – have thus been a or BRI).
useful wake-up call. Australian interests would be directly In the past two decades, Chinese activity in the Pacific has
jeopardised if China were to establish a military base so close expanded dramatically – from aid, loans and sensitive infra-
to Australian shores. But even without that scenario, the pros- structure projects, such as undersea telecommunications and
pect of a Pacific island government turning to the guns and data cables, to trade and investment, resource exploitation,
truncheons of a one-party nationalist megastate to suppress education, propaganda, policing links, diplomatic dialogue
domestic dissent is confronting. and political pressure.
A long contest has begun. The aim cannot be to exclude one Still, it’s not a comprehensive or categorical takeover. For
of the world’s greatest powers from the largest ocean. That instance, China remains far from the largest aid donor to
is neither a realistic strategy nor what most of the region’s the region. Indeed, its rate of commencing new projects has
governments and peoples want. Instead, the challenge for declined markedly in the past few years, following a decade
Pacific island states and their international friends is to craft of acceleration.
an inclusive vision for long-term development and protection Japan has long been the softly spoken achiever in Pacific
of sovereignty. assistance, steadily around the sixth-largest contributor
China has a rightful place in the Pacific, just not the right to and specialising in strengths such as stewardship of fisher-
dominate. If many partners sustain their commitment, then ies. Moreover, the Asian Development Bank – in which Japan
all Pacific nations will benefit and strategic rivalry need not and the United States have the largest roles – remains a vital
permanently shadow the future of the blue continent. lender for many Pacific nations.
Any conversation on the international relations of the Pacific But Beijing’s impact is not in scale alone. It converts activ-
must be grounded in the interests, values and identity of the ity into influence. Its aid projects are high profile, such as
Pacific nations. The September 2018 Boe Declaration of the government buildings, sports stadiums, telecommunications
Pacific Islands Forum provides this starting point with unde- towers, medical centres and multi-lane highways. These are
niable clarity. Here is an “expanded concept of security”, typically funded by loans, which local elites see as easier to
including human wellbeing, environmental protection and get (more red flag than red tape), even though they add to
resilience to disasters. Health, social inclusion and prosperity unsustainable debt.
are common goals. Collective stewardship of the shared “Blue
Pacific” is affirmed. Empire and disruption
So are the principles of the UN Charter: non-interference, China has become busy, but that does not prove it has a
non-coercion and a rules-based order. Climate change is grand strategy for the Pacific. Given the sheer scale of China’s
emphasised as the single greatest threat: rising seas, not rising capabilities, combined with its destabilising impetus as an
China, are front of mind. authoritarian power impatient to impose change, other na-
tions can’t afford to wait for a fulsome exposition of its plans
Strategic ambition before deciding how to respond.
The many nations of Melanesia, Micronesia and Polynesia Resilience means being prepared for multiple futures. One
have every right to want to develop and coexist free from is that China seeks to dominate the Pacific in every sense
strategic rivalry. Still, it has found them. The Boe Declaration – commanding resources, political influence and military
itself acknowledged the unavoidability of “a dynamic geopo- access – as part of a strategy for region-wide hegemony and
litical environment leading to an increasingly crowded and to challenge the United States globally. But another disturbing
complex region”. prospect is that, as with other colonial undertakings, there’s a
Australia and the United States are sometimes accused of self-perpetuating spiral of infiltration.
foisting an anti-China campaign upon small countries deter- Either way, we now see an authoritarian giant pursuing
mined to avoid taking sides. This is false, both as narrative wealth, control and presence across one of the world’s most
and chronology. The resurgence of strategic ambition in the vulnerable regions, and therein lies risk for all. China’s quest

22 Islands Business, February 2023