Page 30 - IBs November 2022

Opinion Opinion

U.S.-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP

ABROGATES ESTABLISHED ORDER

By Kaliopate Tavola egy’s implementation plan and its architecture.
However, this commitment is security-related and geostra-
The United States signed the Declaration on U.S.-Pacific tegic in its intention. That automatically links itself to the
Partnership with fourteen Pacific Island Countries (PICs) in roles of Australia and New Zealand under existing arrange-
Washington on 29 September 2022. Of the sixteen PICs, mem- ments – Australia, for instance under the Indo-Pacific Strategy,
bers of the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF), only Niue and Kiribati the QUAD and AUKUS, and Australia and New Zealand through
did not sign. Their absence, however, was anticipated for Partners in the Blue Pacific (PBP), an initiative by Australia,
reasons that were considered legitimate. Australia and New Japan, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United
Zealand, on the other hand, who complete the 18-member States “for more effective and efficient cooperation in sup-
PIF/Pacific regionalism, did not participate in the ceremony. port of Pacific Island priorities”.
They were not invited. It should be noted that when the PBP was first announced,
To give credence and legitimacy to the U.S., it can be said it was received in the Pacific with much disapproval. Dr
that its intentions had always been to sign this Declaration Tarcisius Kabutaulaka, a Solomon Islands academic at the
with the PICs. The eleven commitments, ‘the mounting chal- University of Hawaii, for instance, was reported to have said
lenges of our time’ in the Declaration, can be legitimately that such ‘initiative rides roughshod over established regional
aligned directly to the interests of PICs. processes.”
Three of the commitments, however, have references that Furthermore, PBP’s ‘strategic equilibrium’, its suggested
are traditionally linked to the PIF in general. The second device for seeking consensus whenever it consults with PIF,
commitment provides for the signatories of the Declaration/ is unproven. Questions remain unanswered: What will be the
Partnership to bolster Pacific regionalism. The implication sitting arrangement for Australia and New Zealand when PIF
here is not clear. Does it mean that the U.S. will work to join consults with the PBP as members of both sides? Which hat

What is its real purpose here under this Declaration? Your guess
is as good as mine. Methinks that this is essentially a reminder of

the U.S.’s superiority in all matters of defence and security in the
Pacific.

force with the PICs to operationalise the various projects and will they prefer to wear during such consultations?
processes of PIF that include Australia and New Zealand? Or What is its real purpose here under this Declaration? Your
does it mean that PICs will use the U.S. as a filter for issues guess is as good as mine. Methinks that this is essentially a
that they want to discuss with Australia and New Zealand? reminder of the U.S.’s superiority in all matters of defence
The sixth commitment resolves to protect the Blue Pacific and security in the Pacific. Such an expression of superiority is
and enhance the laws that govern it. The Blue Pacific is PIF’s so blatant even to the extent that any self-contradiction con-
own leitmotif and is also used by the group as its form of tained therein is considered as a fait accompli which requires
identity. Both Australia and New Zealand can therefore relate no explanation.
to the Blue Pacific and its sub-themes of ‘ocean identity’, The seventh commitment in the U.S.-Pacific declaration
‘ocean geography’, and ‘ocean resources’. Does this commit- reaffirms the signatories’ ‘respect for the ability of nations
ment therefore bind them to a Declaration of which they are to make sovereign decisions in the best interests of their
not a part? people.’ It should be noted that this did not apply - initially
The Declaration’s seventh commitment resolves to maintain perhaps, to the Solomon Islands Government (SIG) when it
peace and security across the Blue Pacific Continent. The Blue earlier signed a bilateral agreement with China under its own
Pacific Continent is merely an extension to the Blue Pacific sovereignty. When the SIG was asked subsequently about its
and is formally appended to PIF’s own 2050 Strategy for the reason for signing the U.S. Declaration, it was reported that
Blue Pacific Continent. Both Australia and New Zealand are it was because a reference to ‘China’ was eventually deleted
currently working with the PICs in developing the 2050 Strat- from the text.

30 Islands Business, November 2022