Page 35 - IB April 2022

Opinion Opinion

‘Free and open Indo-Pacific’ was an indelible feature of most existential of which is climate change. This is highlighted
Japanese extra-regionalism and multilateralism in the mid to under PIF’s Boe Declaration.
late 2010s. This current version, of course, is a replica of the So you can imagine the antipolarity of the two positions
Japanese model. The strategy, whilst allowing governments held by the US vis-à-vis the PICs. In such a situation, any co-
to ‘make their own sovereign choices, consistent with their operative effort to formulate solutions is destined to fail.
obligations under international law’, will however respond The other interesting point under this section is the implied
harshly and retributively to any Pacific Island Countries, for consistency of the U.S.’ One China policy as against its Taiwan
instance, that applies its sovereign rights to establish bilater- Relations Act. Ordinarily, this seems an irreconcilable con-
alism and or partnership with PRC. Where is the sovereignty, tradiction. All global activities that are polarising the world
one may ask? currently will only tend to lend this contradiction irreconcil-
The second element of the strategy is ‘Build connections ability. That spells global disquiet.
within and beyond the region’. It provides for: ‘the alli- The Strategy’s fifth and final section is: ‘Build regional
ances, organisations, and rules that the United States and resilience to 21st century transnational threats’. This section
our partners have helped to build must be adapted; where focuses on climate change. The big question here is what will
needed, we must update them together’. The plea by the the U.S. do, if anything, to get Australia to toe the line as
U.S. for togetherness under its own Strategy is anticipated. As regards compliance of the Boe Declaration and its existential
stated above, such togetherness in terms of the Indo-Pacific threat of climate change?
membership, but not parties to the strategy, is abetted by the The prospect of any bilateral initiative to get Australia
anodyne nature of the various aspects of the strategy. on-line with the Declaration is nil. There are no positive signs
‘Drive Indo-Pacific Prosperity’ is the third element of the on the horizon. The signs, one sees, however, are all discour-
strategy. This section is effusive as regards its plan for close aging. The U.S., for example, is party to AUKUS, the newly

This only goes to show that PICs are essentially marginal in any discus-
sions relating to Indo-Pacific. PICs’ takeaway from all this is that they
will continue to be treated as pawns in global geopolitical discussions,
under existing political alignments and partnerships. This opens up the
prospects of new and political alignments and partnerships, not only
at the national levels but also at the subregional, regional and extra-
regional levels.

economic integration, increased foreign direct investment established appendage to Indo-Pacific, bringing UK into the
and the US as an investment partner, broad-based economic group. This move to sanction AUKUS and its activities is di-
growth under its Indo-Pacific economic framework, rapid rectly in defiance of the positions of PIF as regards all nuclear
technological transformation, new approaches to trade and activities, as per the provisions of the Treaty of Rarotonga
closing infrastructural gaps. 1985.
All very nice. However, in reading the text, one gets the This only goes to show that PICs are essentially marginal in
idea that all these are being focused ‘on both sides of the any discussions relating to Indo-Pacific. Pacific Islands Forum
Pacific.’ The reference in quotes in the previous sentence countries’ takeaway from all this is that they will continue to
actually gets two mentions in the text. The large expanse of be treated as pawns in global geopolitical discussions, under
the Pacific that constitutes the area’s centrality does not draw existing political alignments and partnerships. This opens up
any mention at all. the prospects of new and political alignments and partner-
Having said that, and to be fair, the Pacific Islands did get ships, not only at the national levels but also at the subre-
a mention under the Strategy’s 10-point ‘Indo-Pacific Action gional, regional and extra-regional levels.
Plan’. It features as the eighth element of the plan, and it
factors in: ‘Partner to Build Resilience in the Pacific Islands.’ editor@islandsbusiness.com
The fourth element of the Strategy is: ‘Bolster Indo-Pacific
Security’. Under Indo-Pacific, security is essentially military The author is a former Fijian Ambassador and Foreign Minis-
threats. This is totally opposed to the security conceptualisa- ter and runs his own consultancy company in Suva, Fiji.
tion of PIF which sees security as all forms of threat; and the

Islands Business, April 2022 35