Jul 14, 2020 Last Updated 9:26 PM, Jul 10, 2020

 

Tuvalu has asked Pacific Leaders to consider deferring the formal appointment of the new Secretary General of the Pacific Islands Forum until a face-to-face meeting next year.

Islands Business is aware of four candidates for the role; Cook Islands Prime Minister Henry Puna, Marshall Islands Ambassador to the US, Gerald Zackios, international civil servant to the UN and regional organisations, Tonga's international and regional civil servant  Amelia Kinahoi Siamomua and former Pacific Community (SPC) Secretary General, Solomon Islander Dr Jimmie Rodgers.

However  Pacnews reports  that Tuvalu Prime Minister and chair of the Pacific Islands Forum, Kausea Natano has written to Leaders asking them to accept a proposal by Vanuatu to defer the formal, face-to-face session Pacific Islands Forum Leaders meeting to 2021 – to be hosted by government of Fiji.

Natano is requesting a virtual Special Forum Leaders Retreat later this year to consider the ongoing impacts of the COVID19 pandemic on the region and Vanuatu’s offer to host the annual Leaders meeting in 2023.

The contract of current Secretary General, Dame Meg Taylor expires at the end of this year, but Leaders could extend it until they meet face-to-face next year.  Alternatively they could vote for one of the four contenders. The jockeying has already begun.

A mere decade before the Pacific Island Countries join the rest of the world to account in terms of what we have done collectively to deliver the 2030 promise and the Sustainable Development Goals, a global pandemic has struck the earth with devastating consequences.

The crisis is forcing governments and policymakers to consider the unavoidable trade-offs between saving lives and preserving jobs and livelihoods.  Countries have been grappling with the collision of a triple menace – COVID-19, climate-related disasters, and rising domestic violence – compounding the wide-ranging challenges for sustainable development, national security and foreign policy.  The new challenges further stress an already difficult position for the Pacific Islands Forum.

The outcomes are not the same for everyone and the crisis is forcing governments to consider the painful questions and hard choices between inequality and economic growth, the redistributive and resetting pressures of building and strengthening health systems and preserving jobs and livelihoods that makes small states of the region economically dependent on foreign influence, aid-dependency, and soft power initiatives. 

The uncertainty in transitioning to a durable solution is unique with COVID-19, as there is a dilemma of managing the profound and long-lasting shock in the context of addressing the pre-existing challenges of poverty and inequality. The challenges are wide-ranging, from care work, including unpaid care work; to preparedness and readiness of health and social systems, to repatriation of nationals and travel bubbles; from economic recovery to debt-management, and the list continues.

The Pacific Island Forum’s vision for its peoples is one that is both familiar and ever-evolving, in response to the changing currents of the new world regime. Resetting the Blue Pacific has to be a Pacific story driven by the Pacific leaders’ aspirations for a region of peace, harmony, security, social inclusion and economic prosperity through assertive diplomacy, assessing the diverse voices and paying much more attention to the large swaths of the Pacific Blue Continent. The timely invoking of the Biketawa Declaration and the establishment of the Pacific Humanitarian Pathway on COVID-19, as the avenue for the one Blue Pacific family to manage recovery and build back better is a point of convergence for resetting. Resetting with stronger genuine and durable partnerships as promoted by the Pacific Small Island Developing States (P-SIDS) along with the rest of the world’s SIDS in the SAMOA Pathway for sustainable development and using the 4Cs for effective delivery and lasting impact.   

The novel COVID-19 pandemic has challenged the region’s priorities and sustainable development goals, demanding innovative ways, and enhanced cooperation at all levels. The situation calls for a reset in the regional approach to these issues, in a way that is bold and innovative, while tapping into the deepest strains of our Pasifika psyche and traditions.  In tackling, we must not revert, instead, this is a once-in-a-lifetime to lay the foundations for a new revitalised Pacific way that will benefit generations to come. 

“Lalanga” or weaving, is a tradition that is common in communities and societies of the Pacific, whether from Micronesia to Melanesia and Polynesia.  This fundamental skill of our communities to weave baskets, mats, clothing or fishing nets, entails a patient and careful approach by multiple hands, laying strand upon strand, with overarching view of what the finished creation will be.  Lalanga, however, is more than weaving.  As our ancestors have taught us, the lessons of Lalanga — coordination, cooperation, commitment, and care (4C’s) — can be applied methodically through our life’s challenges.

In resetting the pathways for the Blue Pacific, we should enhance our traditional knowledge of the 4C’s. For a new normal, the regional architecture must be enhanced and sustained to ensure that the 4Cs of the Pacific Lalanga drive regional actions and deepen collective responsibility and accountability to deliver on the promises of sustainable development under the prospective 2050 Blue Pacific Strategy. The strands of 4Cs for the Lalanga must be stronger and more assertive. 

The growing interest of the world in the Pacific requires a rethink and reset of the Forum’s security and foreign policy positions to safeguard the stability and strengthen the resilience and sustainable development of the Blue Continent.  As described by the World Bank, the shocks of COVID-19 are causing the world economies to experience the deepest global recession in decades, despite the extraordinary efforts of governments to counter the downturn with fiscal and monetary policy support.

To eliminate and stop the spread of COVID-19 and its impacts, means not reverting to business as usual.  It is instead an opportunity to get it right, so that no one is left behind and that we could be in the same boat and we all come through this together. It is an opportunity to reinforce the links between climate actions and sustainable development, adaptation responses with goals of environmental conservation, economic development and societal wellbeing of all peoples of the Pacific. 

At this critical juncture, we must ask: Is Pacific regionalism robust and ambitious enough to navigate this new terrain effectively, and are the 4Cs working?

The Pacific Islands Forum is a coalition of the willing to protect the interests of its member states. It is committed to ensuring that the future of the Blue Pacific cannot simply be left to chance but requires a collective commitment to achieve it.  The 4Cs of coordination, cooperation, commitment and care are not new, but need rejuvenation with more assertive diplomacy, development cooperation and investment now to support member countries to manage the long-lasting shock of COVID-19 and build back better toward a post-COVID-19 durable solution. 

The greatest risks of the final decade towards 2030 are present, and every effort must be better coordinated, every opportunity for development cooperation must be seized to prevent further shocks, and manage existing shocks for P-SIDS.  The commitment of Forum Leaders to act now is demonstrated in the 2019 Forum Leaders endorsement of a 2050 Strategy for the Blue Pacific Continent.   It reflects a commitment to urgency for making it happen.  

The 2050 Strategy must be concrete, with binding and realistically achievable targets, and with the financial capacity and investments for implementation.  As we have learned from our ancestors, the 2050 Strategy during such an unprecedented epoch should not ignore our traditional 4Cs. Through our history of cooperation, mechanisms, and responses to coordinate economic and humanitarian aid can seamlessly be integrated. The key elements of the complex challenges of the vulnerable Pacific infrastructures and increasing costs as related to development assistance and foreign policy are also critical to the 2050 Strategy. More assertive diplomacy is needed with attention to multilateral mechanisms and protocols to boost Pacific regionalism for building back better. Let’s not forget our traditional knowledge.

The COVID-19 pandemic is a common threat and must be tackled using the 4Cs of Lalanga of coordination, cooperation commitment, and care for a better Blue Pacific.

Amelia Kinahoi Siamomua is a Pacific islander and an expert on regional and international affairs, serving more than 30 years as an international civil servant in the United Nations system and other international organisations globally, including the Pacific region.  She is the Tongan Prime Minister’s nominee for the position of Secretary General of the Pacific Islands Forum.

Delving into PICTA

  • Jul 14, 2020
  • Published in June

In the last issue of Islands Business, I discussed the abysmal state of the Pacific Island Countries Trade Agreement (PICTA) and concluded that there was indifference in the way signatory countries have regarded and treated this trade agreement. This article further pursues this matter to try to find out what is really going on and what lies behind the surface of the immediate problem.

I wanted therefore to use a political economy analysis (PEA) to get behind the scene. My search for any PEA of PICTA or of Pacific Island Countries (PICs)/Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) in general was unrewarded. The Pacific region lacks the depth of analysis and research that other regions take for granted.

I searched elsewhere for a guide. I was rewarded with a PEA of regional integration in Africa’s East African Community (EAC) with its finding pointing directly to the twin shortages of ‘political will’ and ‘capacity’ as being responsible for obstructing regional integration.

I opted therefore to use the finding as first basis of my own attempt at a PEA of PICTA. I figured out that if these twin shortages were obstructing regional integration in EAC, they are likely to be doing the same with the more specific regional economic integration driven by a trade agreement. And, given therefore, the similarities in developmental status of the EAC and PICs – comprising both developing and least developed countries, it can be concluded that those twin shortages would also apply to regional economic integration involving PICs.

On reflection, such a methodology and its deductive conclusion is not far off the mark. The shortages of political will and capacity resonate loudly with Pacific regionalism. For example, regional commentators, from time to time, have identified shortage of political will to explain the wide implementation gap regarding decisions reached by regional leaders. As regards capacity, a paper tabled at the ‘What We Can Learn’ regional symposium of 2012 stated: “….capacity is a key constraint both to policy development and policy implementation……Building capacity is at the top of all our priorities. It is however a long-term issue.”

Having come this far, I opted to apply a PEA to PICTA and of related regional economic integration, albeit, in a non-rigorous manner. Political economists have their own tool for PEA – a five lenses framework, with series of sub-lenses under each category.

From historical, geographical and other related lenses, the PICTA signatory countries – with exception of Papua New Guinea (PNG) are all small island developing states (SIDS), with small economies characterised by lack of resources that give rise, for example, to rent-seeking. Capacity is clearly a constraint. All are recipients of overseas development assistance (ODA). On a per capita basis, the region as a recipient of ODA scores very highly.  

When it comes to the acquisition of imported resources, these SIDS are constrained by the quantity and range of exports and thus by their ability to purchase their imports. They are further constrained by the tyranny of distance. Their relatively low degree of integration into the global economy restricts them from taking full advantage of various trade concessions, preferences and incentives that are available to them.

On the other hand, PNG and Nauru have/have had relatively large mineral resources. However, there is evidence of Resource Curse and Dutch disease. The abuse and mismanagement of the economy resulting from them tend be linked to capacity constraint and thus underdevelopment generally.

As regards the shortage of political will, the evidence also speaks for itself. The most prominent lens that irrefutably points to lack of political will is what can be referred to as ‘rules of the game’. That is that Pacific regionalism is - generally speaking, voluntary. Leaders and ministers who readily make decisions at the regional level are not obliged legally to comply and implement those decisions - either at national or regional levels. Furthermore, there is no political cost for non-compliance. Ministers do not lose their jobs for not implementing those decisions.  This has contributed directly to the growing implementation gaps that characterise Pacific regionalism.

This situation has changed somewhat under the Biketawa Declaration when it comes to regional security. It should be noted that it was under the provision of this Declaration that Fiji was suspended from PIF in 2009. However, there are other lenses that bring up the same evidence of lack of political will.

The 14 PICTA signatory countries belong to four sub-regional groupings, viz: Melanesian Spearhead Group (MSG), Polynesian Leaders Group, Micronesian Chief Executives Summit and the Smaller Island States (SIS). Five of these signatory countries have cross membership of two subregions. Only the SIS is structurally part of PIF. It can be envisaged that for these PICTA signatory countries, there would be a tendency to prioritise subregional issues before PICTA, which transcends subregional borders. This is particularly true for the MSG members who already have their own Free Trade Agreement in the MSG Trade Agreement.

The same can be said for PICTA signatory countries that have strong bilateral relations. The three Micronesian signatory countries, for example, have the Compact agreement with the US; The Cook Islands and Niue enjoy a special political arrangement with New Zealand; Nauru and PNG have special bilaterals with Australia.  Bilateral interests, in these cases, are likely to prevail over any PICTA issues. This can spill over to politics.

Another aspect of the ‘rules of the game’ is that Australia and New Zealand are PIF members. They also happen to be two of the largest aid donors to PICs and are the biggest contributors to the PIF budget. Their influence in regional matters can be overwhelming. Add their respective bilateral influences on specific PICs, they do indeed represent sizable diversionary forces form PICs’ own regional economic integration. Australia and New Zealand’s seasonal labour schemes, for example, may have contributed to the lack of political will for PICTA and the prospects for its regional economic integration benefits.

Related also to the ‘rules of the game’ is PICTA’s Rules of Origin (ROO). This is being modernised. It can be deduced therefore that such ROO currently lacks concessions such as cumulation that can incentivise value adding amongst the signatory countries. This is unlikely to motivate politicians.

There is also the factor relating to the diversity of size of countries and economies – from tiny Niue, to large PNG; from the smaller islands of Polynesia to the relatively larger islands of Melanesia. Such diversity can be divisive. It can breed indifference and lack of drive for any regional integration by way of PICTA, for example, especially if national development and economic growth are already proving difficult to sustain. This can only raise questions as to whether this wider engagement will be cost-effective – PICTA being the first Free Trade Agreement for the PICs concerned. The status of the private sector development in the region and its lack of concerted influence is perhaps reflective of assumed cost-ineffectiveness of regional economic integration.

The realisation that the twin shortages of capacity and political will are constraining regional economic integration in PICTA signatory countries is perhaps not unprecedented. Regional commentators have entertained and affirmed such ideas in the past. For them, such a revelation is nothing to write home about. What this intimation hopes to achieve however is that it may drive the regional planners and strategists, who are currently formulating the 2050 Strategy for the Blue Pacific Continent, to seriously factor in shortages of capacity and political will in their planning to the extent of having to design new, imaginative and enterprising operational and structural features of Pacific regionalism, even if unprecedented, to take us through the post-Covid-19 new world order.

 

PICTA: Picture of indifference

  • Jul 14, 2020
  • Published in May

PICTA stands for Pacific Island Countries Trade Agreement. It is a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) negotiated amongst the Pacific Island Countries (PICs) to free up trade amongst themselves, under the provisions of ‘GATT 1947’, which morphed into ‘GATT 1994’ that is incorporated into the WTO Agreement. PICTA was signed in 2001 and came into force in 2003. But implementation was delayed until 2007. As of today, only seven PICs are trading under this agreement.

The situation depicted above has not changed since 2010, 10 years ago. In a workshop, sponsored by the Pacific Islands Private Sector Organization (PIPSO), the European Union (EU) and the Pacific Regional Integration Programme (PACREIP) in 2010, its outcomes document had this to say: “They are concerned therefore that only 7 of the 14 PICs are currently implementing PICTA. They believe that this is retarding regional economic integration and delaying the realisation of the collective economic and social benefits and improvements to the living standards of all the peoples of the Pacific region. They further believe that the delay in the benefits of regional economic integration under PICTA will constrain our ability and capacity to negotiate a fully meaningful PACER Plus with Australia and New Zealand.”

Later, on 5-8 November 2012, in a ‘What Can We Learn Symposium’, sponsored by six organisations including regional, United Nations and aid agencies, Dr Roman Grynberg, former Director of Economic Governance at the Forum Secretariat lamented the fact that PICTA “has thus far been of the most limited success.” He put the reasons down to: “there was no appetite amongst island officials and policy makers for any form of liberalisation that involved a direct adjustment cost. Whereas island officials have always been happy to write, sign and even ratify trade agreements, implementing them and accepting the real economic costs were quite another matter.”

After 19 years since signing, and 17 years since the agreement came into force, it can only be said that the current status of this trade agreement, the first for PICs, is most unfortunate indeed. The regional economic integration that PICTA was supposed to bring about is still very much at its infancy.

The founders of Pacific regionalism, way back in 1971, had conceived such a FTA would free up Intra-PIC trade and would further develop into an economic union, permitting initially the free movement of capital, labour, goods and services. By specifically targeting an economic union, the regional leaders then would have envisaged a Pacific-wide common market that went beyond trade, also envisaging prospects of coordination of various social, fiscal and monetary policies amongst participating nations.

However, after 49 years of regionalism, it can be said that the early regional leaders’ dream remains a pipedream. Recent decisions by those who could transform this situation have not helped. The Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) Trade Ministers’ meeting last February failed to give PICTA the thrust it needs to get it urgently going forward and to expediently make a difference to regional economic integration.

The PIF Trade Ministers’ outcomes were a damp squib. For PICTA, the ministers “also recognised the importance of …PICTA and its potential to facilitate intra-regional trade.” This is essentially saying the obvious. The FTA’s importance and potential were the qualities that drove the early regional leaders to negotiate the agreement in the first place. What is to be gained from such reiteration? This speaks volumes of the foresight of our early leaders but not much about our current leaders.

Furthermore, the use of ‘also’ in this context implies that such a statement was an afterthought. This presents an interesting angle. PICTA is a matter for PICs trade ministers only. But in this case, trade ministers from Australia and New Zealand (ANZ) were present during the discussions. Was the language of the outcomes especially aimed at sugar-coating due to the presence of the two elephants in the room?  

It did not stop there. The next part of the decision was extraordinarily naïve. Ministers indicated the direction further discussions could take but provided only if such and such were done. They failed to give concrete direction and action-oriented instructions as how those issues that were thwarting the ratification and implementation of the FTA could be expedited.

Admittedly, the issues involved are not simple. These are to do with what is now termed as the ‘modernisation work on PICTA’, including the extensive PICTA review and the Rules of Origin review. I can imagine that someone had coined ‘modernisation’ since the issues have been there on the table for donkeys’ years and have somewhat lost their vitality.

For the PICs trade officials and PIF Secretariat (PIFS) staff after the ministers’ meeting, it may be just business as usual. They have not heard any plea for urgency and certainly no specificity of actions to be taken both at the national and regional levels. There was no mention of additional resources. There was no mention of the legal, technical, political and consultative measures that need to be mobilised to progress matters. There was no mention of the measures directed at mobilising the private sector representatives at the national level and at the regional level through PIPSO. There was no mention of the prospects of technical assistance (TA) that PIFS staff should extend to members especially to the Smaller Island States (SIS).

It is difficult to be optimistic about PICTA given its dismal history. But one can be proven wrong. The trade officials may have reached a tipping point and could now be driven to do all they can despite the vagueness and the absence of commitment in the ministerial directives. This is a possibility given the commendation they have received recently from Professor Jane Kelsey of Auckland University.

The good professor was a resource person for the ministerial meeting last February. Whilst she was impressed with the quality of some of our trade officials, she was not however with the Forum Secretariat. Her assessment of the latter was that whilst there has been an improvement, the Secretariat is still inadequate in servicing the needs of the PICs. The Secretariat lacks the ‘fundamentals’ and the ‘nuances’ to identify the real needs of the PICs and the ‘independence’ to address them. If there was a vindication for the provisions of TA by PIFS for its deserving members, this was it.  

The case of PICTA and its stunted history raises two big issues for Pacific regionalism. The first is that if PICs are not getting the benefits from this trade agreement as intended, then questions have to be asked about the suitability of the model around which the agreement is built. Professor Kelsey has already told us that the model is broken. So, what can be put in its place?

There is also the question of the suitability of a regional grouping of only small states. Can such create the net benefits needed? Would PACER Plus with ANZ be a better configuration for a regional trade agreement?

Big questions need critical thinking on the part of our regional planners. These are all food for thought for the regional strategists who are developing the 2050 Strategy for the Blue Pacific Continent and for the next PIF Leaders’ meeting scheduled for August later this year in Port Vila.

The Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) Trade Ministers met in February in Suva. Their key outcome on the World Trade Organization (WTO) was: “there is support for the multilateral trading system and the opportunity therein to address global trade concerns including harmful fisheries subsidies.”

In the global context of the roles of WTO and the multilateral trading system, the support above is essentially general affirmation of globalisation. Such formulation of an outcome however is not new for PIF. Previous outcomes statements have reflected the same or similar support.

However, such an expression of support raises more questions than answers. Firstly, out of the eighteen PIF members, only eight are WTO members – six Pacific Island Countries (PICs) – Fiji, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, and Vanuatu; and the two developed countries of Australia and New Zealand. Then why should the other ten PIF members, non-WTO members, be included in the decision, one may ask. Obviously, the Trade Ministers had decided by consensus. That could mean that the non-WTO PIF members did not object to the decision.

The non-objection by the other ten PIF members would have been political to allow a decision to prevail in the interest of group solidarity. But more so, the non-WTO members know very well that regardless of their non-membership, they still benefit from the provisions of the WTO. They know, for instance, that they have benefitted from the WTO initiative of Aid for Trade (AfT). AfT resources, have been re-committed by Australia and New Zealand under the PACER Plus, and a good share of that is being disbursed through the Pacific Horticultural and Agricultural Market Access (see Islands Business July 2019).

The second question is a more substantive one. Despite all the downsides of globalisation, despite the growing inequality globally resulting from capitalism that powers global economic growth, despite the inaction of the Doha Round of trade talks (Doha Development Agenda) that was aimed at elevating the  trade and economic interests of developing countries and the least developed countries—those underprivileged under international trade— why is there still support for WTO and the multilateral trading system (MTS)?

In retrospect, it has to be said that such support is an affirmation of the benefits that WTO and MTS have generated through international trade for the region, despite their shortcomings. And these benefits can potentially increase. Furthermore, the support emanates from the realisation that all other options apart from the existing MTS will render the global trading community worse off.

WTO and the MTS it champions is rules-based. Obviously, some rules are negative and some positive. Their respective applications also create mixed results for the global trading community. Under GATT 1947, incorporated into the WTO Agreement, PICs have been able to negotiate their Free Trade Agreements (FTAs), like PICTA and PACER Plus - the latter with Australia and New Zealand, despite the fact that the negotiating model offered by the WTO is ‘broken’ – according to Professor Jane Kelsey of Auckland University.  

PICs continue to use the model since it produces a rules-based regional trading system that is better than a trading framework with no, vague or draconian rules. Furthermore, they continue to place their hopes on the model believing that the same model can result in better regional FTAs – better concessions, more creative special and differential treatments, derogation from general provisions and waivers - if there is genuine political solidarity and commitment to configure/reconfigure Pacific regionalism to something that we can all be proud of.

Furthermore, the immense benefits that PICs/Pacific African Caribbean and Pacific States (PACPs) have accrued from their membership of the ACP-EU Agreements can also be attributed to the WTO Agreement. This is so since the ACP-EU Agreement has been notified under the WTO, and its preferential arrangements are granted exceptionality under the Organization. Over the years, such exceptionality has been extended. It may also have been preserved for posterity under the application of a ‘grandfather clause.’

Fiji, for example, has benefitted immensely from the Sugar Protocol - an arrangement that offers supply quotas and preferential pricing. The Sugar Protocol, like all the other protocols offered by the EU, are formulated and implemented under the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP).

The CAP offers other preferential arrangements that have benefitted other PACPs. Fiji and others have benefitted also from EU’s Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) and may even so  from its more liberal version of GSP+. PACPS that are least developed countries (LDCs) and that export to the EU benefit under another preferential arrangement known as ‘Everything But Arms.’ The term denotes exactly what it can do and what LDCs can export preferentially to the EU.

The Americans have their own version as well. Under the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), 2000, the US offers enhanced market access to qualifying Sub-Saharan African countries. This has been extended to 2025. Fiji, in the early 2000s, was contemplating negotiating a similar arrangement that could be extended to other PICs.

As stated above, these benefits can potentially increase. Developing countries and LDCs still hold on to the hope that developed country members of the WTO will find sufficient unity and determination in their ranks to progress the provisions of the Doha Development Agenda thus creating new levels in LDCs’ respective integration into the global economy. Under that framework, it is hoped, that new creative concepts to improve the lot of developing countries and the LDCs will become more palatable.

Two concepts in this respect have entered the lexicon of the WTO recently. Emily Jones wrote in 2013: “The Right to Trade: A Mechanism for Revitalizing Pro-Development WTO Negotiations?” She later introduced in the same article: ‘right to development’. She added: “Having raised deep concerns about the failure of ‘aid for trade’ (Joseph) Stiglitz and (Andrew) Charlton make ambitious proposals for rebalancing the global trading system. The first pillar of their proposal is to enshrine and enforce a ‘right to trade’ and a ‘right to development’ through the WTO’s dispute settlement mechanism (DSM).”  

For the PIC members of the WTO, that will be most welcome. Wilfred Golman of the University of the South Pacific wrote in 2017: “The WTO DSM and the South Pacific Island Nations’ (SPIN) Participation.” Golman concluded from his research that SPIN countries were notably absent from the WTO’s DSM. He discussed a number of reasons why this was so, including: the continuing debate as to whether the DSM accommodated the interests of the developing countries or LDCs; the issue of fairness in DSM’s decisions (that the process favours richer countries as they were able to argue more effectively and settle their cases), and that the poorer countries were disadvantaged by constraints on their ability to pursue any trade infringements at the WTO level.

As tools for globalisation, there is a sense of inevitability around supporting the WTO and the MTS, regardless of their respective downsides.  This essentially evolves from the understanding that global traders, large or small, lack a better trading framework option than that presented by the existing MTS.  With the benefit of history, it can be concluded that any setback to the MTS and a reversion to excessive and uncontrolled trade protectionism will inevitably return the global trading system to one of ‘Beggar Thy Neighbour’ situation, or much worse. When that happens, international traders will essentially be engaged in a kind of zero-sum game. The end result is likely to be unprecedented global inequality.

The author is a former Fijian Ambassador and Foreign Minister and runs his own consultancy company in Suva, Fiji.

 

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