The Pacific Islands Forum Leaders, at their meeting in Funafuti, Tuvalu, last August, endorsed the development of a ‘2050 Strategy for the Blue Pacific Continent.’ Leaders thus tasked the Secretariat ‘to work closely with Members to prepare a draft strategy for Leaders’ consideration in Vanuatu in 2020.’ It is expected that in due course detailed terms of reference (TOR) will emerge.
However, there are ample references and directions in the Tuvalu Communique that will inform the TOR. Apart from providing clarity, these references and directions are of interest in that they present a mix of conventionality and novelty. Whilst the former is run-of-the-mill, the latter is curious. So much so that it fuels speculations that the format and the architectural configuration of the future Forum, in the context of the new Strategy, is likely to be a radical departure from what has prevailed since the inception of the Forum in 1971.
The first approach agreed to by Leaders is curious. Leaders welcomed the offer by the former PM of Tuvalu to commence dialogue to formulate a new 2050 vision. It would be expected of course that former PM Sopoaga, as the then chair of the PIF Troika, would initiate any action towards realising the Strategy. But this is not stated categorically in the Communique. This fuels speculation that Sopoaga had been hand-picked for other reasons.
It is general knowledge that Sopoaga has been regularly speaking out publicly against Australia for undermining the Boe Declaration. Recently, he questioned the justification of Australia’s membership of the Forum. Fiji PM Bainimarama added his weight to that viewpoint after the Funafuti meeting. In this general context, Sopoaga proposed the idea of a ‘United States of the Pacific’ (see June 2019 IB Issue) as a forum for Pacific Island Countries (PICs) only “to amplify their concerns about climate change on the global stage.”
Even more curious is the Leaders’ sanction that in envisioning the 2050 vision, Sopoaga needs only to focus on the ‘vision for PICs that recognised the Blue Pacific Continent.’ This is an unequivocal reference to restricting the vision to only a sub-grouping of Forum members without the developed country members of Australia and New Zealand (ANZ).
Furthermore, Sopoaga’s sanctioned TOR also apply to ascertaining how PICs ‘can form an effective union.’ As if that was not clear enough, the Tuvalu Communique then made the link to the SAMOA Pathway and the Boe Declaration as existing platform upon which to build this exercise.
The SAMOA Pathway is the UN-sponsored Action Platform for small island developing states (SIDS Action Platform). In the context it is used, the SAMOA Pathway is acknowledging the Pacific SIDS (PSIDS), a recognised grouping in the UN. PSIDS was also used interchangeably with PICs in the region up to 2016. Since then, two French territories have become Forum members and any continued usage of such interchangeability needs qualification.
It can be envisaged therefore that the provisions of the Tuvalu Communique are intended to ring-fence the PICs and their visions so that they can be prioritised in the proposed 2050 Strategy. The added reference to the Boe Declaration as a basis to build upon, is essentially to ensure framing into the new Strategy PICs’ ‘safe and secure future for the Pacific in the face of climate change.’ Note that the Boe Declaration reaffirms ‘that climate change remains the single greatest threat to the livelihoods, security and wellbeing of the peoples of the Pacific and our commitment to progress the implementation of the Paris Agreement.’
The SAMOA Pathway will of course provide directions as to how the PICs’ specific interests should be framed in the new Strategy. The Pathway, like the UN’s ‘The Future We Want’ before it, ascribes the status of ‘a special case’ to SIDS ‘for sustainable development in view of their unique and particular vulnerabilities and they remain constrained in meeting their goals in all three dimensions of sustainable development.’
The status of ‘a special case’ is a critical concept for the formulation of concessions and other forms of special and differential treatments. It can be applied across issues as widely as imagination, innovation and commitment allow. It is essentially a guide intended for global partners particularly on how to package their respective development assistance for optimal utility to the final beneficiaries.
In the context of the Tuvalu Communique, the ring-fencing of the PICs by way of consideration of an ‘effective union’ and the specification of their own distinctive visions were intended as tools for envisioning the new Strategy. They cannot be considered any other way. The new Strategy is to be founded on the unity of the current Forum membership. That is implicit. ANZ are foundation members of the Forum; which is not in any doubt. Inclusivity is a fundamental principle of the Forum. The challenge of course is to recognise this prevailing unity which envelops its constituent parts.
The tools for envisioning the new Strategy above, however, are essentially contingencies for structural review of the Forum’s architecture intended to preserve the unity of the group. Such a review is not just for the sake of another review. It is in the genuine interest of creating an architecture that will transform Pacific regionalism and maximise benefits to its membership, especially the PICs. A possible architecture envisaged would be one that offers space for a PICs-only forum with an overarching link to ANZ’s own forum. The overarching architecture, with its relevant governance structure, becomes the new Forum. ANZ already have their Closer Economic Relations (CER) and they may consider this as the natural component to counterbalance the PICs-only forum under the new architecture.
After 48 years of Pacific regionalism, the Forum drastically needs to demonstrate increased returns on its investment, cost-effective operations, and that the region is coherently integrated – generally and economically, apart of course from its effective integration into the global economy. There is more to be done. PICs have to increase tangible benefits from regionalism. The Forum Secretariat in particular, has to avoid being the whipping boy in the region.
The idea of a PICs-only forum in the greater context of the Pacific Islands Forum, is not new. Regional commentators, for example, have explored the two-caucus approach that launched the South Pacific Forum as a way forward to increasing the benefits to members, especially PICs. I referred earlier to Sopoaga’s idea of the United States of the Pacific. This was in the context of having a structure that would amplify PICs’ agency on climate change globally. In my chapter: ‘Towards a New Regional Diplomacy Architecture’, in Greg Fry and Sandra Tarte (eds) The New Pacific Diplomacy, I explore the prospect of such an architecture.
For the Forum, the new 2050 Strategy is intended as a plan, an undertaking and a framework aimed at ‘securing our future in the Pacific.’ The novelty of an approach with which to envision the new Strategy, sanctioned by Forum Leaders, is constructive. It is also a tacit acknowledgement that run-of-the-mill solutions for Pacific regionalism may have seen their heyday. It is time to be innovative. A new reality dawns. I foreshadowed such prospect in my latest article: ‘Death of Pacific Regionalism?’ Propitiously, a sea change for the Blue Pacific Continent beckons.
• The author is a former Fijian ambassador and Foreign Minister and runs his own consultancy company in Suva, Fiji.
I was impressed by the words of Vice-Chancellor, Professor Pal Ahluwalia, during the USP’s Emalus Campus graduation ceremony in Port Vila when he said: “Continue to live by the values of your University in all that you do; embody excellence, embrace innovation, uphold the highest ethical standards and operate with integrity; be respectful, and celebrate diversity.” I recalled enrolling for my first university courses after college in 2010 at the USP Santo Campus. My dream started with a little and tiny piece of hope because I never thought I would ever continue to the end, given that only the lucky ones were given an opportunity for scholarship to travel to Suva where most of USP’s face-to-face courses are offered. After nine long years my dream came true: I finally walked up the stage to receive my certificate, graduating with a BA majoring in Journalism and Politics on 29 November 2019.
Next year the global women’s and feminist movement will commemorate Beijing+25 – the 25th anniversary of the adoption of the Beijing Platform for Action (BPfA) by 189 UN Member States.
The Beijing Platform for Action includes women and armed as conflict as one of 12 critical areas of concern. It reaffirmed the historical role of women peacebuilders and women as powerful drivers of peace movements, and unequivocally stated that peace is inextricably linked to equality between men and women, and to development. The BPfA listed essential measures to advance peace and equality, including reductions in military spending and controls on the availability of armaments. It affirmed women needed ”to be at the table” to participate in decision-making around conflict resolution and stressed that those who have fled conflict are entitled to fully participate in all aspects of programmes to help them recover and rebuild their lives. The Beijing Platform for Action also specifically addresses the struggle of women living in colonies and non-self-governing territories by calling on member states and civil society to support and promote the implementation of the right of self-determination of all peoples by providing special programmes in leadership and in training for decision-making.
This month the people of Bougainville will vote in a referendum on independence under the terms of the Bougainville Peace Agreement.
“Women have been sustaining the peace” says Agnes Titus from the Nissan Islands of the Autonomous Region of Bougainville in Papua New Guinea. She and other women walked into the jungles and brokered peace with armed combatants, bringing an end to a 10-year armed conflict. For more than 30 years, Agnes, and women leaders like her—mothers of the Bougainville Women’s Movement and leaders of theWomen’s Human Rights Defenders Network in whose name peace was brokered, weapons collected and political agreements adopted— have been sustaining peace, providing recommendations for a sustainable approach to development, and a shift from ‘from gender based violence to gender justice.’
“A referendum about the political future is the ultimate realisation of our human rights to choose our political status” says Titus who is a gender expert with the GPPAC Pacific network. That network has established the Shifting the Power Coalition—forged by diverse Pacific women and women’s organisations from Fiji, Papua New Guinea including Bougainville, Samoa, Tonga, Vanuatu, Australia, and the Pacific Disability Forum—which is demonstrating the power and potential of our collective leadership to achieve peaceful and gender-equal societies.
The coalition reflects recommendations that birthed the Pacific Regional Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security – which reaffirmed that the protection of women’s rights is central to all humanitarian efforts, must be integrated into early warning, response, recovery and resilience building, and that women’s rights organisations must drive community-based responses. The high level adoption of the regional plan by Pacific Forum Leaders in 2011, was a major achievement for Pacific women peacebuilders.
The network has also been instrumental in ensuring our leaders understand and respond to climate change as a security issue, and the need for our governments and the United Nations to bring about a gender inclusive shift from reaction to prevention when meeting this challenge.
Fiji’s recent statement at the recent UN Security Council Open Debate on Women, Peace and Security (WPS) highlighted the region’s recognition of climate change as the single greatest threat faced by our people and countries. Loss of land, even whole islands, increased hunger, more frequent droughts and persistent damage to infrastructure have an intense potential to fuel instability and conflict. The WPS framework will, increasingly need to be a climate crisis-informed one.
But while we welcome the recognition of the climate change crisis within recent UN security council and Pacific Forum meetings, we must ensure that this is about enhancing and ensuring the security of our most affected communities. It requires alignment of the Pacific Resilience Framework and the 2018 Boe
Declaration to enhancing the peace, development, humanitarian and human security nexus from an inclusive conflict-prevention approach that considers the root causes of violence and conflict.
It requires a new multi-actor consultative framework for regional peace and security that supports community representatives who can localise and operationalise women, youth and civil society peacebuilding, prevention and participation frameworks. We do not just need be consulted, but supported to enhance our infrastructures for peace and security at local and national level.
The UN Secretary General’s 2019 report on Women, Peace and Security is a clear reminder that since the adoption of the Beijing Platform for Action (BPfA) in 1995 and the adoption of 10 security council resolutions dedicated to the women, peace and security agenda, there are record levels of political violence targeting women were demonstrated in new data published in May 2019.
Over 50 parties to conflict are credibly suspected of having committed or instigated patterns of rape and other forms of sexual violence in situations on the agenda of the Security Council and at least 1 in 5 refugee or displaced women experience sexual violence and 9 out of the 10 countries with the highest rates of child marriage are in fragile contexts. In 2019 alone, nearly 132 million people need humanitarian aid and protection, including an estimated 35 million women, young women and girls who require lifesaving sexual and reproductive health services, and interventions to prevent gender-based violence and respond to the needs of survivors. Findings by the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights defenders show that the rise of misogynistic, sexist and homophobic speech by political leaders in recent years has contributed to increased violence against women, against lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer and intersex individuals, and against women human rights defenders. The Pacific is not immune to these issues.
Serious consideration must be given to shifting the power to national and local women’s rights actors, to strengthen agency, amplify voice, build on collaborative opportunities including women-led coalitions and feminist practices. We must support local innovation.
Committing to these two principles will enable a shift from funding of crisis-reaction financing to gender-responsive peacebuilding and preventative action. This will also enable women’s leadership across the peace cycle, from the immediate response and assessment through to recovery measures.
Participation requires greater accountability to human rights treaty commitments including the UN Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) when national action plans are being developed. It also means financing and applying special measures to operationalise the WPS and human rights agenda
It must pave the way for better protection for women’s peace activists and prevention of all forms of violence. There must be sustained resourcing for inclusive and innovative peacebuilding practice and leadership, including the wider civil society and social movements including traditional systems and faith communities.
Instead of military spending and militarised solutions, there must be resources so young women can design peaceful and secure futures alongside other generations. 2020 is an opportunity to strengthen the way we plan and respond to peace and security issues, by ensuring women can lead, and so ensure the needs of our most vulnerable communities are being met.
Sharon Bhagwan Rolls is the Chairperson, Gender Liaison and Pacific regional representative of GPPAC – the Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict. She is the Technical Adviser of the Shifting the Power Coalition. email@example.com
THE following opinion piece by Fiji solicitor, Filimoni Vosarogo is a response to the reported detention and questioning of a 16-year-old boy for allegedly writing vulgar language on the back of a bus, which was aimed at Fiji’s Prime Minister. The boy was reportedly taken in through a ‘citizen’s arrest’ enacted by two Fiji Military Forces soldiers.
THE case of a 16-year-old being shuffled off into a vehicle by unknown men despite the protest of his aunt is an act of ‘thuggery.’ No one should be allowed to act with such impunity and not be answerable for it, servants of the law or not. For a few days, we waited for details of the so-called arrest and or investigation into the bus dirt writing. People called for an investigation and update. Then as surely as water down a creek, it all seems to arrive to the sea of public knowledge. Fiji’s Human Rights and Anti-Discrimination (HRADC) Director said he communicated with the Police Commissioner and was told they are investigating. What they are saying really is – hold off, we are doing our job! HRADC Director then reminds the public to understand such process, as we should all try to avoid trial by media. That, I understand! (for now, I will come back to you Mr Director in a while in the case of Bulitavu).
Within days, the Police Commissioner (COMPOL) comes out publicly, in the media and issues a press release, even praising the ‘off duty military officers’ who responded to what we are made to assume was a call of duty to investigate a young offender (defined in Section 2 of the Juvenile Act 1973 as a person between 14 – 18 years) for alleged offences. We are not informed to date, what they are! So, if they were officially required for a statutory duty, why was there a reference to private or citizen’s arrest in the press release. From the release, it looks as if the men were conducting a ‘citizen’s arrest’! Surely, the COMPOL hadn’t been advised properly or that the drafters think, well, if we give the public such big words and sections of the law and God forbid, the Constitution, no one would question it. Well, not this time! Let me unpack these reasonings to see if the skeleton argument could stand.
For a citizen’s arrest to be lawfully made, the offence has to be committed in the presence of the person effecting the arrest. So, there is the procedural and evidentiary requirement of contemporaneity of the suspected crime or crimes and the arrest, not days later. Secondly, one can only effect citizen arrest for an indictable offence.
Let me put this at rest now. No possible offence under the Public Order Act 1969 nor any under the Crimes Act 2009 that could possibly be charged for the bus dirt writing is indictable – period! If the press release drafters are referring to the same Section 22 of the CPA 2009 I know, someone slept through that criminal law class, not me! (I’d have to admit, I had my fair share of sleeps in criminal law and procedure, they tend to get boring by the hour). All in all, it was a mish mash of reasoning, singularly could be capable of belief if packaged right but collectively, designed to pull wool over people’s eyes.
Back to the 16-year-old. No parent or guardian should ever have to face this type of impunity again at the hands or force of State officers, authorised or not. Too much power in the hands of a few always result in tyranny. These men who by force effected the arrest with such arrogance of the law, may not know of the historical and horrendous era of decades of tyrannical powers in the earth’s vast continents in the past and their damage, but historians and legislators alike from nations who have risen from such times have called and treasured from their experience, ‘human beings must always be jealous and guard their liberty at all cost.’ They are too costly to lose!
That is why the bill of rights in our constitution, by virtue of it being a negative document, is never to be read as the government giving us freedoms. It is not! It is the people, through the constitution-making process, giving the government a set of enumerated powers, we all agree to as limitation to our inalienable rights and freedoms. It is upon those limitations, and only on those limitations, can the government act on limiting it.
There was no reason on earth, why the police themselves didn’t make the arrest, if there was reasonable cause to suspect an offence was committed. When it comes to young offenders, policing takes on a different shade altogether. Parents or guardians are required by law to be present.
The safeguards of Section 13 of the Constitution must be applied, if he was indeed, lawfully arrested. The Social Welfare Director becomes involved in certain cases as guardian ad litem. These are matters that these macho men know no ounce about in effecting their own brand of arrest. That is why there is a specific Juvenile Bureau in the Police Force, they know of procedure and of how to deal with them. The Police was better equipped to deal with the issue and for want of reason, how they were not involved in the investigation baffles me.
Now to the Constitutional powers of the Commander of the Republic of Fiji Military Forces (RFMF) having overall security of the nation responsibility and the rest of it. Yes, I have read Section 129 and 131 of the Constitution, dealing with the powers of the COMPOL and Commander RFMF (CRMF) respectively. No, I don’t agree with the drafted press release on the application of Section 131 – CRFMF powers.
The press release appears to suggest that for a single suspected breach of the law by a young offender (and only suspected), the power of the Commander had to be activated, as if the thousands of police officers, were incompetent to handle it. To ensure that security, defence and well-being of Fiji and all Fijians is by construction, a law designed to give the Commander the power to ensure that at no time or hour, borders, zones or homes are endangered by external elements and or invading forces.
The section doesn’t mean what the press release drafters think it meant. The section is a protection law designed against external invasion, to say it in modern warfare terms. Internal domestic policing of crimes or any other law where the result of which is, an interrogative process designed to go to the courts, is governed by the Police Act 1965 and the CPA 2009 and that is squarely, the police’s responsibility. The law is never designed to bring confusion. COMPOL is policing. CRFMF is defence of nation. This applies to their respective employs. The law always maintain connection to common sense to remain humane and it is hoped, we have all come down to that common understanding on the application of Section 129 and 131 of the two most important roles of COMPOL and CRFMF.
I mentioned to start with that I wondered what offence or offences has been committed here. At best, against what law? The drafted press release makes reference to the Public Order Act 1969 (supposedly, because it is the Act that gives allowance, not direct powers to act but only if certain pre-conditions been met, for military officers can arrest people - none of which was met in this story). You all know there isn’t any breach there!
Has the young offender taken an unlawful oath? Control of arms and ammunition? Meeting or procession breaches? Terrorism offences? Disturbance, malicious acts, incitement to violence or inciting racial antagonism? I have just laid out the general spectrum of public order offences and clearly, bus-dirt writing isn’t any of the above. So, there was no justification on those military officers acting parochially and with egotism to arrest a young offender, barely two years after, graduating as a child by law.
The boy, if indeed, he was the offender, needs to show respect. No one, including any in his family would want their names on a back of a bus like that. He hasn’t committed the summary offence of damaging property (the closest to what he may have done which is graffiti) but he may have annoyed a person. That, if indeed proved is a summary offence, the young offender must apologise for it and the parents or guardians must make such undertaking to ensure that they would teach him patterns of citizenry of which his family may be known for.
I write this as a parent to three teenage boys. To hear that able-bodied men come to your house and act as if they are not accountable to anyone, show force and threatening by their presence and remove without your knowledge and consent one of your sons should never be tolerated in our society.
One wonders what motive theycarried. Don’t they realise that parents these days fear the repetition of soldiers taking a young person away, who later dies of internal head injuries from the punishment inflicted on him? It is sickening that it continues to be done with impunity. You should be ashamed of your actions. You should go and apologise to the young boy’s family. You should – if you are a father yourselves or becoming one!
As for you Mr Raj, double standard. You encourage restraint in this case to remove any possibility of trial by media but in the Bulitavu case, you were in the media well before the police even acted and began investigating, culminating in the interview. You like the ‘officers’ I can only whisper the famous Lord Denning casting line ‘Be you never so high the law is above you.’
JULIAN Agnon of Blue Ocean Law recently penned ‘Enduring Colonization: How France’s Ongoing Control of French Polynesian Resources Violates the International Law of Self-Determination.’ The paper however is silent on the other French territories of New Caledonia and Wallis and Futuna. For New Caledonia, its route to independence is mapped out under the Noumea Accord and the laws impacting its resources may vary from those of French Polynesia. Wallis and Futuna has no equivalent accord. But all are listed under Part Four of the Treaty establishing the European Community as France’s overseas territories.
Such a claim of violation by France is likely to hit a raw nerve in the psyche of the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) members, particularly of Forum Island Countries (FICs) that are actively galvanising for French decolonisation at the United Nations. The legal verification of the violation, tendered by Agnon, will add fuel to the decolonisation process in the Pacific.
PIF, in the first place, has to manage the situation presented here. At first, when French Polynesia and New Caledonia became PIF members, by way of a consensus resolution which was subsequently acknowledged as being political, it was envisaged by some that this might undermine decolonisation efforts in the Pacific. This was concluded because once those two French territories were let into the PIF, it would lead to increased presence of metropolitan France in regional affairs of the Forum and the dynamics of regional decisions could change to accommodate the French voice.
However, the concern generated by the Agnon paper is fundamental to the whole question on the decolonisation process and is likely to raise strategic complications on how PIF members should accommodate this French voice. How can FICs, for example, persist at the UN to push for decolonisation when the prospects of increased French influence as a development partner, are increasingly being programmed into regional activities? How can they support Pacific churches who have recently raised their call for decolonisation of French Polynesia in particular?
As can be expected, the clash between bilateral and regional considerations will, inevitably, come into play. Geopolitics will intrude. How can PIF members, especially PICs, reconcile these considerations? There are those, supposedly, that can compartmentalise these considerations and make judicious regional decisions. It may not be easy. But it is doable.
However there are those who will find it difficult. Australia, for instance, had sought French engagement in the Indo-Pacific geostrategic framework and continued to do so, as reported by The Australian last June. Australia, therefore, may not rock the French boat. New Zealand is likely to do the same given it had indicated its acquiescence to Australia when both had consulted prior to the imposition of Indo-Pacific.
Papua New Guinea can be capricious. When its former Prime Minister had a state visit to Paris in 2016, he was reported to have said that he “would like to see PNG become a significant hub for France in the Pacific.” That bilateral sentiment that frames national issues can get in the way of decisions to grow and unite Pacific regionalism under its current Framework (The Framework for Pacific Regionalism).
Vanuatu, on the other hand, can be a fence-sitter on regional issues and decisions aimed at circumscribing French engagement in Pacific regionalism. Ni-Vanuatu are beneficiaries of a new French initiative to travel visa-free to New Caledonia. Furthermore, considering the country’s condominium history involving France and Great Britain and the remnants of the colonial shared power structure on ni-Vanuatu and their culture, it can be envisaged that their balancing act of fence sitting can topple on the side of the metropolitan player that happens to be the flavour of the month. This can be favourable or unfavourable depending on the issue being discussed.
In retrospect, however, such undermining of Pacific regionalism is not new. The sapping of PIF’s foundation through the preponderance of national and bilateral sentiments
over regional ones has frustrated PIF for years since its inception. A careful and systematic political and economic analysis of PIF, under various popularly-used analytical lens including, for instance, ‘Actors, political elites, agency and incentives’, will verify this.
That is one question, albeit a critical one, that the Forum and its Secretariat, PIFS, will have to address. There are others, equally vexatious.
French decolonisation, by virtue of its particularity in the context of Pacific regionalism, is considered a bilateral issue – that between PIF members on one side and France, on the other. The subject matter may not be relevant for the collective Forum Dialogues partners. PIF/PIFS may need to programme a specific bilateral, or a series of bilaterals with France, to raise the matter. In the same way PIF/PIFS needs a special bilateral with Indonesia to raise the issue of West Papua.
The French voice in regional matters has become more vocal since the membership of French Polynesia and New Caledonia in 2016. There have been reports of French insistence to be heard in matters relating to the authority and management of Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) of those two PIF members. The Forum Fisheries Agency (FFA) is grappling with this matter when it comes to related regional fisheries management.
Furthermore, the use of the French language in regional meetings apart from those of the Secretariat of the Pacific Community (SPC) has been raised. It appears that this comes across with a carrot on a stick. It is reported that the new PIF members would even pay for the introduction of the language and for all the concomitant facilities this requires. The offer of payment however has attracted unsolicited speculation: that this wouldamount to resources being directly disbursed from the treasury of the metropolitan.
When all is considered, the French language is already a language of the Pacific, and of Pacific regionalism. SPC is a member of the Council of Regional Organisations of the Pacific (CROP), chaired by the PIFS Secretary General and it uses French as one of its two working languages. It can be envisaged therefore that inclusion of the French language to all other PIF meetings is possible but complex and costly in terms of staffing, equipment and logistics.
However, linguistics aside, in the context of still-raw French colonial and post-colonial sentiments, this appears like a red rag to a bull. It is debated in some circles that if French is added as a lingua franca, why not any of the national languages of the Pacific Island Countries? Or why not one of the existing patois?
Another vexatious question confronting PIF/PIFS is how to manage logistically the negotiations for a post-Cotonou agreement. The Pacific ACP (PACP) States have started their negotiations with the EU on a Pacific-EU Protocol. Neither French Polynesia nor New Caledonia is included in PACP States that negotiate directly with the EU despite their PIF membership. They cannot therefore sit with PACP States during the negotiations.They do however sit as members of PIF and could have access to sensitive information about the negotiations. Management of such information by PIF and also by the Forum Secretariat staff plays a critical role here.
To date, French territories have always had their separate provisions under various ACP-EU agreements since Lome 1. How will French Polynesia and New Caledonia be treated now that they are members of PIF?
The author is a former Fijian ambassador and Foreign Minister and runs his own consultancy company in Suva, Fiji.