Sep 21, 2019 Last Updated 3:13 AM, Sep 21, 2019

JULIAN Agnon of Blue Ocean Law recently penned ‘Enduring Colonization: How France’s Ongoing Control of French Polynesian Resources Violates the International Law of Self-Determination.’ The paper however is silent on the other French territories of New Caledonia and Wallis and Futuna. For New Caledonia, its route to independence is mapped out under the Noumea Accord and the laws impacting its resources may vary from those of French Polynesia. Wallis and Futuna has no equivalent accord. But all are listed under Part Four of the Treaty establishing the European Community as France’s overseas territories.

Such a claim of violation by France is likely to hit a raw nerve in the psyche of the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) members, particularly of Forum Island Countries (FICs) that are actively galvanising for French decolonisation at the United Nations. The legal verification of the violation, tendered by Agnon, will add fuel to the decolonisation process in the Pacific.

PIF, in the first place, has to manage the situation presented here. At first, when French Polynesia and New Caledonia became PIF members, by way of a consensus resolution which was subsequently acknowledged as being political, it was envisaged by some that this might undermine decolonisation efforts in the Pacific. This was concluded because once those two French territories were let into the PIF, it would lead to increased presence of metropolitan France in regional affairs of the Forum and the dynamics of regional decisions could change to accommodate the French voice.

However, the concern generated by the Agnon paper is fundamental to the whole question on the decolonisation process and is likely to raise strategic complications on how PIF members should accommodate this French voice. How can FICs, for example, persist at the UN to push for decolonisation when the prospects of increased French influence as a development partner, are increasingly being programmed into regional activities? How can they support Pacific churches who have recently raised their call for decolonisation of French Polynesia in particular?

As can be expected, the clash between bilateral and regional considerations will, inevitably, come into play. Geopolitics will intrude. How can PIF members, especially PICs, reconcile these considerations? There are those, supposedly, that can compartmentalise these considerations and make judicious regional decisions. It may not be easy. But it is doable.

However there are those who will find it difficult. Australia, for instance, had sought French engagement in the Indo-Pacific geostrategic framework and continued to do so, as reported by The Australian last June. Australia, therefore, may not rock the French boat. New Zealand is likely to do the same given it had indicated its acquiescence to Australia when both had consulted prior to the imposition of Indo-Pacific.

Papua New Guinea can be capricious. When its former Prime Minister had a state visit to Paris in 2016, he was reported to have said that he “would like to see PNG become a significant hub for France in the Pacific.” That bilateral sentiment that frames national issues can get in the way of decisions to grow and unite Pacific regionalism under its current Framework (The Framework for Pacific Regionalism).

Vanuatu, on the other hand, can be a fence-sitter on regional issues and decisions aimed at circumscribing French engagement in Pacific regionalism. Ni-Vanuatu are beneficiaries of a new French initiative to travel visa-free to New Caledonia. Furthermore, considering the country’s condominium history involving France and Great Britain and the remnants of the colonial shared power structure on ni-Vanuatu and their culture, it can be envisaged that their balancing act of fence sitting can topple on the side of the metropolitan player that happens to be the flavour of the month. This can be favourable or unfavourable depending on the issue being discussed.

In retrospect, however, such undermining of Pacific regionalism is not new. The sapping of PIF’s foundation through the preponderance of national and bilateral sentiments

over regional ones has frustrated PIF for years since its inception. A careful and systematic political and economic analysis of PIF, under various popularly-used analytical lens including, for instance, ‘Actors, political elites, agency and incentives’, will verify this.

That is one question, albeit a critical one, that the Forum and its Secretariat, PIFS, will have to address. There are others, equally vexatious.

French decolonisation, by virtue of its particularity in the context of Pacific regionalism, is considered a bilateral issue – that between PIF members on one side and France, on the other. The subject matter may not be relevant for the collective Forum Dialogues partners. PIF/PIFS may need to programme a specific bilateral, or a series of bilaterals with France, to raise the matter. In the same way PIF/PIFS needs a special bilateral with Indonesia to raise the issue of West Papua.

The French voice in regional matters has become more vocal since the membership of French Polynesia and New Caledonia in 2016. There have been reports of French insistence to be heard in matters relating to the authority and management of Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) of those two PIF members. The Forum Fisheries Agency (FFA) is grappling with this matter when it comes to related regional fisheries management.

Furthermore, the use of the French language in regional meetings apart from those of the Secretariat of the Pacific Community (SPC) has been raised. It appears that this comes across with a carrot on a stick. It is reported that the new PIF members would even pay for the introduction of the language and for all the concomitant facilities this requires. The offer of payment however has attracted unsolicited speculation: that this would
amount to resources being directly disbursed from the treasury of the metropolitan.

When all is considered, the French language is already a language of the Pacific, and of Pacific regionalism. SPC is a member of the Council of Regional Organisations of the Pacific (CROP), chaired by the PIFS Secretary General and it uses French as one of its two working languages. It can be envisaged therefore that inclusion of the French language to all other PIF meetings is possible but complex and costly in terms of staffing, equipment and logistics.

However, linguistics aside, in the context of still-raw French colonial and post-colonial sentiments, this appears like a red rag to a bull. It is debated in some circles that if French is added as a lingua franca, why not any of the national languages of the Pacific Island Countries? Or why not one of the existing patois?

Another vexatious question confronting PIF/PIFS is how to manage logistically the negotiations for a post-Cotonou agreement. The Pacific ACP (PACP) States have started their negotiations with the EU on a Pacific-EU Protocol. Neither French Polynesia nor New Caledonia is included in PACP States that negotiate directly with the EU despite their PIF membership. They cannot therefore sit with PACP States during the negotiations.
They do however sit as members of PIF and could have access to sensitive information about the negotiations. Management of such information by PIF and also by the Forum Secretariat staff plays a critical role here.

To date, French territories have always had their separate provisions under various ACP-EU agreements since Lome 1. How will French Polynesia and New Caledonia be treated now that they are members of PIF?

The author is a former Fijian ambassador and Foreign Minister and runs his own consultancy company in Suva, Fiji.

PHAMA Plus was launched in Suva on 11 April 2019 although it has been operating since 1 November 2018. The ‘Plus’ tag signifies that it is a follow-up to the original PHAMA, which is the acronym for Pacific Horticultural and Agricultural Market Access. This multi-country Aid for Trade (AfT) programme is funded by Australia and New Zealand. Like all AfT funding, it is aimed at helping developing countries, in particular Least Developed
Countries, to build trade capacity and the infrastructure they need to benefit from trade.

AfT is an initiative of the World Trade Organisation (WTO). It was launched in 2005 at the WTO Conference in Hong Kong. Its taskforce was established the year after in 2006, and 2007 saw its first stage of implementation. The following year indicators were formulated to help with its monitoring. The 2015 WTO Conference in Nairobi further boosted its recognition and importance. Annual monitoring of AfT since 2009 had been conducted to achieve specific developmental outcomes. For example for 2009, the theme was ‘maintaining momentum’ and for 2010 it was ‘showing results.’

The original PHAMA started in 2011. Initially, an AusAIDfunded initiative, NZAID joined later. The initiative focused on five Pacific island countries (PICs): Fiji, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga and Vanuatu. At the time, only Fiji, Solomon Islands and Tonga were WTO contracting parties. Samoa and Vanuatu became contracting parties in 2012. Papua New Guinea became a beneficiary of the initiative later, and had been a WTO contracting party since 1996.

The original PHARMA facility ran for seven years to 2018. It’s goal “was to increase exports of fresh and value-added agricultural products, contributing to economic growth and improved rural livelihoods. There were three main expected outcomes: (i) increased export volumes, (ii) better farmgate prices, and (iii) protection of existing export markets.” The new PHAMA Plus Program provides a ‘Country Strategy Note’ (CSN) for each beneficiary countries, in which evaluations of the outcomes, and more, are discussed in detail.

In retrospect, each of these PICs has reasons to be positive about the results of PHAMA. In Vanuatu, the last of the PICs above to become a WTO contracting party, PHAMA’s main contributions were in kava, beef, cocoa, sandalwood, handicrafts, beekeeping and food safety.

Vanuatu’s CSN has this to say on ‘food safety’: “PHAMA provided support for Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Points (HACCP) accreditation of three businesses and a HACCP Train-the-Trainer course to build industry and government capacity.” HACCP is a systematic preventive approach to food safety from biological, chemical and physical hazards in production processes that can cause the finished product to be unsafe and designs measures to reduce these risks to a safe level.

PHAMA Plus extends its facilities to the six original beneficiaries of PHAMA as well as to the small island states of the Forum on ratifying the PACER Plus trade agreement.

PHAMA Plus is an A$36million investment spanning four years (2018-2022). It has three end-of-program outcomes: (i) producers and exporters use maintained and new export market access for Pacific export products; (ii) women and men exporters, processors and producers adopt quality and productivity enhancing innovations for their export products, and (iii) women and men staff of Pacific biosecurity authorities perform their market
access facilitation functions better.

For Vanuatu, PHAMA Plus continues the momentum of PHAMA. Eleven sectors were proposed for coverage – from agriculture, livestock, fisheries, forestry and handicrafts. However, for more effective management and approach, these sectors are being grouped into four categories.

Such commitment by Australia and New Zealand, two developed WTO contracting parties, is notable for three reasons. Firstly, Fiji and PNG, despite pulling out from PACER Plus, remain as beneficiaries under PHAMA Plus. Their continued involvement could be justified on the basis of their previous benefit under PHAMA, and because there is still more to be done. Furthermore, they are important trading partners for Australia, New Zealand and the region, under inter-Pacific island countries trade. Under Pacific regionalism and Melanesian Spearhead Group (MSG) sub-regionalism, for example, the contribution by these two PICs to economic integration would be immense. Inter-Pacific island countries trade in the region is currently conducted under the Pacific Islands Trade Agreement (PICTA). For the sub-region it is conducted under the MSG Trade Agreement (MSGTA).

An additional justification is that both Fiji and PNG are WTO contracting parties, like Australia and New Zealand, albeit developing contracting parties. As developed contracting partners, Australia and New Zealand would have drawn on their commitment to helping developing WTO contracting parties from the relevant provisions and spirit of GATT 1947 – the principal WTO guide for the negotiations of Free Trade Agreements (FTA) - especially Article XXIV (Territorial Application – Frontier Traffic – Customs Unions and Free-trade Areas, Article XXV (Joint Action by the Contracting Parties), Part IV: Trade and Development – Article XXXVI (Principles and Objectives), Article XXXVII (Commitments), and Article XXXVIII (Joint Action).

The second reason why Australia and New Zealand’s commitment under PHAMA Plus is of note is that both have agreed to extend this facility to non-WTO contracting parties in general – to small island states, when they ratify PACER Plus. This includes eight Pacific island countries that participated in the PACER Plus negotiations: Cook Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, Kiribati, Nauru, Niue, Palau, Marshall Islands and Tuvalu. Of these, five have signed PACER Plus and are working towards ratification.

The situation that has evolved is not an afterthought. Australia and New Zealand agreed during the PACER Plus negotiations that they would commit resources for AfT. They would have been driven by their sense of commitment - explicit and implicit, in the GATT articles above. Furthermore, they would have been driven by their commitment to Pacific regionalism, especially regional economic integration as they had done over the years through trade and economic instruments like the South Pacific Regional Trade and Economic Cooperation Agreement (SPARTECA) (1981), Pacific Agreement on Closer Economic Relations (PACER) (2003) and PACER Plus (2017).

During the PACER Plus negotiations, Australia pledged an AfT funding target for the Pacific of 20% of Pacific Official Development Assistance (ODA). New Zealand pledged a similar percentage of its total ODA.

The third and final reason why Australia and New Zealand’s commitment is of note is the interactions of different initiatives at play here. An original bilateral initiative by AusAID, in response to its multilateral commitment, became extended bilateral aid with NZAID in the greater interest of Pacific regionalism. The combined facility proved effective and is now extended. It has become a specific tool for multilateralism, from whence it came, and with which Australia and New Zealand can aspire to assist even those countries that are not members of that multilateral body.

United States of the Pacific

  • Sep 22, 2019
  • Published in June

THE derivation of the ‘United States of the Pacific’, (USoP), an optional conceptual supra-state construct for the 48-year old Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) is reminiscent of the Lae Rebellion of 1965. The rebellion marked the break-away by five Pacific Island Countries (PICs) from the South Pacific Commission (SPC, now rebranded as the Secretariat of the Pacific Community) and the creation of the South Pacific Forum in 1971. The brief for the new regional structure is the now-familiar lament of PIC leaders for greater commitment to addressing climate change. The USoP may evoke grandiosity. But as a prospective regional architectural structure, it is not unprecedented; and its time may have come.

It is a rebellion of sorts. Tuvalu Prime Minister Enele Sopoaga is not a happy camper. He takes serious exception to the suggestion by former Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd that Pacific islanders of Tuvalu, Kiribati and Nauru swap Australian citizenship for maritime resources owned by them. Rudd reckons that this would be a long-term solution, in any case, for the three PICs that are likely to go under with rising sea levels.

Since such a suggestion requires these PICs to surrender their respective sovereignty through involuntary constitutional changes, Sopoaga castigates the suggestion as being neo-colonialist and ‘imperial thinking.’ In Sopoaga’s mind, this suggestion is a ‘red herring’ that does not even pretend to solve the problem at hand.

Furthermore, the ire of the good PM is heightened after he notes that such a demeaning suggestion is coming from Australia after the signing of the Boe Declaration in 2018 by PIF Leaders in which climate change is reaffirmed as the “the single greatest threat to the livelihoods, security and wellbeing of the peoples of the Pacific and our commitment to progress the implementation of the Paris Agreement.”

Sopoaga’s resentment is particularly piqued by the fact that Australia had “exported $66 billion in coal last year, making it (its) most valuable traded commodity.” This is not in the true spirit of the Boe Declaration, he feels. ABC reported his statement: “The more (Australia fails to be) serious about cutting coal and exporting this for money, the more problematic the issue of global warning and the more we have to adapt.”

It was in this context when Sopoaga proposed: “the establishment of a Pacific supra-state, along the lines of the European Union (EU), that is based on cooperation and integration, perhaps into some form of United States of the Pacific.” This supra-state will comprise ‘small Pacific Island nations’ and its raison d’être is “to amplify their concerns about climate change on the global stage.”

Reflecting the Lae Rebellion, Sopoaga’s strategic move is to break from the configuration that constitutes the PIF currently to that of the USoP.

The specific architecture of the USoP is a matter of conjecture. It is clear however that it would be a forum of only PICs. What is unclear is whether it is intended as a form of regionalism or federalism or some other variants of the latter.

However, the references to the new entity being ‘based on cooperation and integration’ and exhibiting aspects of the EU, are hints strongly suggesting regionalism and not federalism or any of its variants.

It can be taken therefore that USoP would be an only-PICs/PSIDS forum. This is reminiscent of course of the 1971 SPF that started off as a two-caucus configuration – one for the five PICs and the other for Australia and New Zealand (ANZ). That configuration was determined after the five PICs opted to include ANZ in their new break-away forum. But the two-caucus approach became a single caucus approach in 1972. Australia, interestingly, was the force behind the merger of the two caucuses.

That was then. The direction the current altercation is taking appears to be single-mindedly on formation of a PICs/PSIDSonly forum. And that is essentially on basis of its intended raison d’être. Climate change, caused by global warming, is an existential threat for PICs. Sopoaga’s castigation of Australia’s undermining of the Boe Declaration, but specifically on its coal policy, echoes the concerns of other PICs Leaders. Sopoaga leads from the forefront because of the existentiality of the threat on his low-lying atoll country. Tuvalu is one of the three atoll states in the Pacific seriously impacted by rising sea levels. And on a global level, one of the four.

Questions of a USoP’s rationality and justification are valid considerations. But this has to be viewed from the perspective of existentiality of the threat. In such context, any strategy that promises relief and an escape from a certain devastation, is a strategy worth considering. There is nothing untoward about this. Humans are hard-wired to always seek preservation and self-improvements; and conservation is very much a part of that. Any physicist or futurist will tell you that.

Consideration of sustainability comes next. How can a USoP be made sustainable? How can USoP be effectively resourced? This is an obvious challenge for the PICs/PSIDs. The solution must lie in the collective’s imagination. It is therefore the collective’s responsibility to elevate its imagination to unprecedented heights to seek relevant solutions. If global powers are queuing up to be counted in the Pacific, the largest ocean on Planet Earth, if they are always seeking PSIDS’ support at the UN to get the numbers that secure mandatory majority of backers, then USoP should not be lacking prospective offers of assistance.

From the perspective of good governance and strategic autonomy, USoP has to be sustainably and innovatively funded. This is its quid pro quo.

If, for historical sentimentality and/or propriety, the linkage with ANZ is to be preserved, then this too can be addressed. Possible solutions are within our grasp. Clearly, however, any solution must preserve the PICs/PSIDS-only forum configuration. The idea of a two-caucus approach was tried in 1971, each caucus having its own meeting and then coming together for a joint meeting, then adopting a joint communique as a result.

This two-caucus approach worked recently during the negotiations on PACER Plus. PICs negotiators planned out their trade strategy separately and then they negotiated with their counterparts from Australia and New Zealand.

If the preference is for a more formalised configuration, then we can learn from that existing relationship between the EU and the Pacific members of the African Caribbean and Pacific Group of states (PACPs). PACPs are members of the ACP Group. But under the existing Cotonou Agreement, EU has a direct structural link with the PACPs. The EU has its regional indicative programme with PIF/PIFS and national indicative programmes
with individual PACPs.

In my chapter: ‘Towards a New Regional Diplomacy Architecture’, published in ‘The New Pacific Diplomacy’, edited by Greg Fry and Sandra Tarte, 2015, ANU Press, I provided an architectural configuration that captures such a relationship with Australia and New Zealand. The same configuration can be expanded to link with other global powers wanting to partner with PICs/PSIDS.

Sopoaga’s USoP emerged from the concern about the existentiality of global warming/climate change in PICs and how best this can be addressed by them. It may have come about from disillusionment with PIF member Australia. It does demonstrate however the strength of feeling when an existential threat does not receive the commitment it deserves.

The author is a former Fijian ambassador and Foreign Minister and runs his own consultancy company in Suva, Fiji.

Is PNG part of Pasifika?

  • Sep 22, 2019
  • Published in June

IS our region’s largest country, Papua New Guinea, part of Pasifika? It’s a debate that has recently played out on the pages of an influential PNG blog. Two of the country’s most prominent commentators have their say here, in important discussions about the future of regionalism.

PNG is not Pasifika – we are not so much of the ocean
By Martyn Namorong

Last year in Goroka I attended a party at a hotel. Although hundreds of kilometres from the sea and high in the clouds of the Papua New Guinea highlands, it was a Pasifika themed party.

Luckily I had taken along my sulu on that work trip and so, wearing my sulu and a bula shirt, I was pretty much 100 percent Pasifika for the night. (It also turned out I was the only Pasifikadressed party goer, so by default won the prize that was on offer.)

My Goroka experience provided a glimpse into how PNG wants to be Pasifika but doesn’t behave as such. Not just in fashion, of course, but in terms of common values and more importantly the customs (kastom) that define this region and its people.

My first observation of why I think PNG is not a Pasifika nation is that of how we perceive our physical environment. One really gets a sense of Pasifika as the ‘liquid continent’ when taking off from Honiara, Nadi or Nuku’alofa and noting how tiny are the islands and how vast the ocean. From Port Moresby, you can look to the horizon and see land stretching to the peaks of the highlands.

This is an important contrast because it gives Pasifika people a sense of their place in the world. Do we Papua New Guineans see ourselves as people of that liquid continent of which wrote Tongan-Fijian writer and anthropologist ‘Epeli Hau’ofa?

In the current context of regional integration, do we see ourselves as part of the Pacific Islands Forum’s agenda as people of the Blue Continent with a Blue Economy? Is PNG’s economic future on land or in the ocean like other Pasifika nations?

Questions about a shared Pasifika future are important because, while some policy thinkers at the regional and national level may think so, my view is that PNG doesn’t share this common future with its Pasifika neighbours.

The first and most important reason I say PNG is not Pasifika is that it needs to and wants to industrialise to take care of its eight million people.

Indeed we are already extracting large quantities of carbon (oil and gas) from the ground selling it to the world. And we have coal which we might soon be exploiting.

Harsh as these words read, whilst we will feel negative consequences of climate change, these may not erase our nation from the surface of the earth like they might other Pasifika states.

So while industrialisation means increased carbon emissions and contributing to global warming and climate change, perhaps we can afford to do this because much of our land mass is 1,000 meters above the sea. PNG is also not Pasifika because of the nature of the relationship the State has with Society which is different from other

Pasifika countries. Regional integration is easier if nation states have shared values and principles of governance.

The relationship between State and Society in PNG is one I would describe as paternalistic whereas Pasifika states tend to be more Maternalistic.

In PNG, the economic relationship between state and society is a predatory relationship. Waigani’s predatory elite exploit the land and resources of the people, apparently in the national interest. In terms of the provision of public goods and services, the State tends to throw out its people to fend for themselves and be exploited without social safeguards or even access to justice. Pasifika governments tend to take better care of their people and protect their interests.

There are other perhaps more controversial areas of contrast like culture, sovereignty, decolonisation, demilitarisation and West Papua, but I won’t delve there for now.

My view is that PNG has a very different development trajectory to that of other Pacific island nations.

It won’t be easy to chuck PNG out of the regional space due to historical and geographical reasons, but I believe PNG’s place in the Pacific is similar to that of Australia and New Zealand.

We are a friend, but we are not a member of the Pasifika family of nations

Martyn Namorong is the Coordinator of the Papua New Guinea Resource Governance Coalition, and a member of the PNG EITI Multi-Stakeholders Group (PNGMSG).

PNG is Pasifika by necessity: A response to Martyn Namorong
By Patrick Kaiku

The commentary in PNG Attitude by Martyn Namorong, ‘PNG is not Pasifika – we are not so much of the ocean’, needs rebuttal. Namorong’s critique is not new. Solomon Islands scholar Tarcisius Kabutaulaka made similar observations in relation to Epeli Hau’ofa.

Kabutaulaka stated: “We need to recognise that focusing on the ocean as the element that connects us immediately marginalises the millions of people who live inland, in places like the highlands of Papua New Guinea, for whom the ocean has little significance.”

Kabutaulaka concedes however, that Hau’ofa “challenges us to think in ways that empower us, rather than marginalise and weaken us.”

This terrestrial orientation of Papua New Guineans is natural.

Insulated as we are from others by the perceived vastness of our land expanse, Papua New Guinean exceptionalism can restrict a more holistic, and wholesome, knowledge of our Pacific neighbourhood.

I teach PNG students who initially struggle to name the countries and territories on the unlabelled map of the Pacific region. This is not surprising. To their own peril, even citizens of the United States are terrible with geography, given their own misconception of their place in the world.

Why learn and immerse yourself in the knowledge of other places and cultures, when you are the most powerful state in the world, a continent unto yourself?

The first point in Namorong’s commentary states: “why I think PNG is not a Pasifika nation is that of how we perceive our physical environment.”

Sure, the ocean is not a common identity marker for thousands of Papua New Guineans. The Bainings of East New Britain or Lelet plateau inhabitants of New Ireland don’t identify much with the ocean, even though they live in island provinces.

But is the Blue Pacific or Pasifika simply about the “physical environment”? Pacific Islanders use metaphors to communicate universal values and ideas.

The Blue Pacific is a metaphor, just like Hau’ofa’s “our sea of islands”. The Blue Pacific must be read together with the Boe Declaration of 2018 to understand the context in which it is used.

The Boe Declaration emphasises environmental and resource security, among other things. Surely, these are concerns Papua New Guineans share. The Blue Pacific represents values that PNG acknowledges in its national development blueprints.

Contrary to how we think of ourselves, PNG is a small state. In international diplomacy, PNG depends on multilateralism. PNG aligns with other small states to be effective. Together, small states are numerically formidable in forums such as the United Nations.

The Blue Pacific celebrates the idea of ‘collective diplomacy’. Collective diplomacy has been effective for small island developing states lobbying with other like-minded states.

Small states in the Pacific have success stories in their lobbying initiatives. PNG has been a partner and a beneficiary in these initiatives.

The high-water mark of collective diplomacy in the Pacific was from 1979-1990. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 1982, the 1985 South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty, and the banning of driftnet fishing of 1989, attest to the ‘power in numbers’ in international diplomacy.

Blue Pacific is a renewed effort in collective diplomacy, especially in light of the current geopolitical rivalry in the Pacific Islands and threats of environmental and resources insecurity.

PNG needs the Pasifika because in collective diplomacy, it is the ‘numbers game’ that matters. PNG does not have any hard power capabilities to compel big states to bend to its will. Hence, it must rely on collective action and the soft power effects of collective diplomacy.

Moreover, in the global community, Pasifika is a flexible term that is used in relation to non-Pacific Islanders. It is contextual and denotes certain levels of affinity, much like ‘wantok’. Fijians don’t speak Tok Pisin. But I run into a Fijian outside of the Pacific and he or she is a wantok, simply by virtue of being a Melanesian.

A Papua New Guinea, may not physically identify with the ocean, but the benefit of Pasifika is its expansiveness and inclusivity, just like the physical ocean. That is the whole logic of Hau’ofa’s “world enlargement” thesis.

Namorong also raises a question, “Is PNG’s economic future on land or in the ocean like other Pasifika nations?” The simple answer is yes.

Look at the evidence. PNG is the third largest country in the Pacific Islands in terms of its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) - behind Kiribati and the Federated States of Micronesia.

If we are comparing PNG’s land mass (462,840 km²) with it is total EEZ (2,402,288 km²), PNG is a maritime state because it has more ocean space, than landmass. Indeed, our participation in multilateral initiatives like the Parties to the Nauru Agreement is testament to the resources of the ocean.

Our national security, commerce, and potentially, economic resources are dependent on the ocean. The Goroka resident, living thousands of kilometres away from the nearest coastline may not identify with the sea.

But it is through unrestricted access to important trade routes on the sea that merchandise produced in Asia or Europe reach the Goroka resident. The ocean is the lifeblood of PNG’s commercial relations with the outside world and a free and open sea is in PNG’s national interest.

In terms of resources, the finite land-based resources that are recklessly being extracted will all be exhausted. Where do we think people will start looking to extract resources?

Nautilus insists on mining the seafloor of the Bismarck because of the intellectual property rights from its extractive technology and scientific knowledge of the seabed. These will be highly demanded in the foreseeable future when resource scarcity on the land becomes apparent.

For all we know, the resource wars of the future may be over tracts of ocean floor rich in rare earth metals and other lucrative resources. In the areas of bio-prospecting, David Kenneth Leary identifies the untapped potential of genetic resources of the deep sea. He concludes, “Increasingly the race to the bottom of the deep sea for new developments in biotechnology is also becoming a race to be the first to the patent office”.

Finally, Namorong asserts: “whilst we will feel negative consequences of climate change, these may not erase our nation from the surface of the earth like they might other Pasifika states”.

Sure, PNG may not be erased off the surface of the earth. But parts of PNG’s sovereign space are already facing the prospects of going under water. This will generate its own social and cultural upheavals.

PNG has recorded some of world’s first cases of “climate refugees” (in the Bougainville atolls). Islands such as the Duke of Yorks are also densely populated and the easy way out is emigration.

The dynamics of land ownership and resettlement, as seen in the case of the Manam and Carteret resettlement programs, will come under increasing scrutiny as more low-lying islands of PNG are erased.

Social tensions relating to land resources and cultural assimilation will be the challenge for PNG.

PNG may not be erased off the face of the earth, but that’s no sure comfort at all. Some of its cultures, languages and peoples face extinction as a result of climate change and sea level rise.

Surely the Pasifika can teach us to be modest and frugal.

Patrick Kaiku teaches in the Political Science Department at the University of Papua New Guinea

The debate first appeared in the blog: Keith Jackson and friends:
PNG attitude at asopa.typepad.com

Aligning to Blue Pacific

THE alignment of Step Up, Australia’s foreign policy direction in the Pacific and its New Zealand equivalent, Pacific Reset, was acknowledged by both Prime Ministers Jacinda Ardern and Scott Morrison at their annual meeting in Auckland on 22 February 2019. The foreign policies align at various levels. For the most critical of all alignments in support of the Pacific Islands Forum’s Blue Pacific, New Zealand’s Reset is leading the way. Australia’s Step Up needs to do just that, or a second stumble will frustrate its good intentions.

Paragraph 18 of the Prime Ministers’ Joint Statement affirms this ‘strong alignment’. This represents a lateral alignment. However, the foreign policy directions are also aligned vertically to their respective national security policy statements. Australia’s Step Up is aligned to ‘The Foreign Policy White Paper’, while New Zealand’s Pacific Reset is aligned to the ‘Strategic Defence Policy Statement 2018’.

Further alignment, essentially the two policies’ raison d’ȇtre, is represented by their orientation to support the countries, territories and institutions of the Pacific, home of the two developed countries.

Pacific Reset’s approach is premised on five principles, namely: (i) To demonstrate a depth of understanding of the Pacific shaped by academic, community, civil society, and private sector expertise that exists in NZ; (ii) To exhibit friendship, including honesty, empathy, trust and respect. This means staying in frequent touch at a political level and having frank and open conversation when necessary; (iii) To strive for solutions of mutual
benefit when developing domestic and foreign policy with impacts on the Pacific. For example, pension portability, criminal deportations, climate change, labour mobility and health and education policy; (iv) To achieve collective ambition with Pacific partners and external actors on a shared understanding of what Pacific Island Countries and NZ are trying to achieve together; and (v) To seek sustainability by focusing on the region’s long-term goals, to play NZ’s part in promoting greater autonomy and resilience among NZ’s Pacific friends through improved economic and social achievement.

Australia’s Step Up is a commitment to a range of measures to strengthen the country’s engagement to support a more resilient region, including: (i) stronger partnership for economic growth – e.g. supporting infrastructure, labour mobility, PACER Plus; (ii) stronger partnership for security – e.g. Pacific Security College, The Pacific Fusion Centre and a range of defence, cyber, maritime, health security services; and (iii) stronger relationships between people, ranging from training, church, sports, travel, research and friendship initiatives.

The vertical alignments of the two countries’ foreign policy direction to their respective defence policy statements speak forcefully of an additional alignment. The prominence of security considerations brought on by how best to counter threats, especially that represented by China’s concerted advance into the Pacific, populated both security statements. 

Such a scenario brings both foreign policy statements aligned with those of the Indo-Pacific, which is a geostrategic construct of the Quadrilateral (Quad) countries. This has been imposed onto the whole of the Pacific Ocean, reaching across Asia, the Indian sub-continent, Indian Ocean and right up to the eastern coastline of the African continent. Australia is one of the four architects of the Indo-Pacific. The others are US, Japan and India.

Australia and New Zealand have had consultations on, inter alia, Indo-Pacific. Additionally, the Joint Statement referred to above certainly has language reminiscent of the values and principles of Indo-Pacific. Australia’s alignment to Indo-Pacific is thus by design. That of New Zealand, being supportive, can be said to be by association.

Indo-Pacific is an enigma. Promotional releases by its architects, especially Australia and US, are riddled with contradictions. Professor Rory Medcalf, Head of the Australian National University (ANU) National Security College, for example, said last May that “an Indo-Pacific policy is not, by definition, inherently anti-China.” However, subsequent Australian statements continued their anti-China sentiments. So much so that China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesman Lu Kang had to ask “Australia to drop (its) ‘Cold War attitude.’

Even NZ has been in on the act. The Fiji Times reported last October that “Japan and NZ will work more closely on Pacific issues to make progress in the region amidst China’s influence in the area.” 

To date, there have not been any formal consultations with either the Pacific Islands Forum Leaders or the PIF Secretariat’s Secretary General on Indo-Pacific, as far as I know. Both the former Chair of PIF, Samoan Prime Minister Sailele Tuilaepa Malielegaoi, and Secretary General Dame Meg Taylor, especially the latter, have indicated the lack of any consultation in their recent public engagements. Australia, who should be spearheading such a consultation being a PIF member, has been particularly lax. However, it has not been lax when consulting other metropolitan countries, remote from our shores, like the UK and France on this very subject. 

The other Quad members are all PIF dialogue partners. None, however, has brought up the issue during any of the dialogue sessions. Japan, however, took the opportunity of its 2018 PALM summit, last May, to inform PIC Leaders. Note that this was only for information, not for consultation. 

Solomon Islands academic Dr. Tarcisius Kabutaulaka, lamented, firstly, “the portrayal of PICs as having no agency in the relations that they forge.” Secondly, “the treatment of PICs as pawns in the power play-off between the larger countries.” 

Under its Blue Pacific narrative, PIF is not twiddling its thumbs and letting opportunities pass by. Indo-Pacific has raised a level of urgency in the region and PIF’s Blue Pacific narrative is responding by creating its own coping mechanisms.

Dame Meg Taylor spoke recently at ANU of how the Pacific can maintain and strengthen its own strategic autonomy in the context of Indo-Pacific. This requires that the Pacific’s own “priorities are neither undermined through the breaking of our Pacific solidarity, nor appropriated by the narratives of others not of our region.”

Last February, when Dame Meg spoke at the University of the South Pacific in Port Vila she advanced “The China Alternative: Changing Regional Order in the Pacific Islands.” Essentially, she advocated the framing of such an alternative in the context of the Blue Pacific in order to secure future viability, prosperity and wellbeing. Further, she stressed PIF’s stance on being ‘Friends to All’.

The scenarios invoked by Dame Meg above provide the environment in which both NZ’s Pacific Reset and Australia’s Step Up are aligning to the Blue Pacific narrative.

In the first scenario, note that the muchtouted Pacific solidarity is beginning to break at the seams through Australia’s continued reluctance to consult on Indo-Pacific. Dr. Tess Newton Cain, having analysed the inner working of Australia’s Step Up, has already posed the prospect of it heading for a ‘stumble’. A second stumble is beckoning if Australia continues its faux pas.

The second scenario above requires a ‘pro-China’ stance. If this nomenclature proves too polemical, then consider it as ‘pro-Blue Pacific’, in the name of PIF’s strategic autonomy approach. 

Of the two regional neighbours, NZ is showing the way forward here. NZ has already signed onto China’s Belt and Road Initiative, one of the nine PIF members who have signed. As it turns out, NZ meets much of the requirements of its Pacific Reset’s five principles by signing.

Pacific Reset has firmly stepped up to the challenge.


  • The author is a former Fijian ambassador and Foreign Minister and runs his own consultancy company in Suva, Fiji.

 

.....to read more buy your personal copy at

Page 1 of 5
Cookies make it easier for us to provide you with our services. With the usage of our services you permit us to use cookies.
Ok Decline